Ethiopia: HRLHA Urgent Action and Appeal PUBLIC 13 May, 2012 Violent and Deadly Crackdowns against Worshipers in Ethiopia
The Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa (HRLHA) strongly condemns the Ethiopian Government’s interference into religious affairs and its heavy-handedness against Muslim communities in various parts of the country.
In this religion-based and allegedly government-sponsored violence that openly started around the beginning of February, 2012 and has widespread particularly in the central and southern parts of the country, four people have been confirmed to have been killed by armed government forces,(Musa Gabi 13, student of local madrasa (religious) school, Kamal Irena 60, tailor, Aliyi Waqo 40, peasant, and Shafi Jano Tufa 40; daily laborer) while hundreds of others have ended up in prisons. The four dead, who were from the Gadab Asasa locality of Arsi Zone in Southern Oromia Region, and the killing happened on the 6th of April, 2012 when a very huge crowd of Muslim worshipers where met with well-armed government security forces in front of a local mosque following a Friday “Jum’a” prayer. According to local sources, the violence is resulting from direct and indirect clashes between two contesting forces prior to the upcoming elections of the Counsel of Islamic Affairs at all administrative levels throughout the country. Sources add that, based on the lessons they learnt the hard way in the past twenty years, the majority of the Muslim communities of the country are fighting for the freedom and independence of religious affairs from the government; while the ruling part is struggling to ensure the continuity of its control and monopoly over all aspects of the lives of citizens including religion.
To this end, it is said that the ruling party has allegedly imported its own Islamic sect known as “Al-Ahbash” or “the Habashis”; and through this sect, has already infiltrated institutions like mosques and madrasas (Islamic religious school).
It is now the members and supporters of this Islamic sect known as “Al-Ahbash” that is said to have been behind all sorts of instigations of the current violence, for example, providing unfounded information and/or giving names of the potential candidates and supporters of independent religious affairs elections.
In a document obtained by the HRLHA, from a local mosque in a small rural town of Waliso alone, the names of 67 individuals who were described as members and/or supporters of alleged terrorist organizations, have been signed and submitted on April 29, 2012 by the local mosque official, Takele Anisa Tulu, to the South Showa zone (Waliso) administrative and intelligence office to be dealt with in some ways and prevented from being an obstacle to the ruling party’s winning the election. Ironically, it has been confirmed from the same document which submitted to intelligence office, all those alleged members and/or supporters of terrorist organizations were either local religious leaders, civilian, government employees, students, and teachers or principals and administrators of local religious school. Asked by an MP about the widely spread religious violence during a parliamentary discussion last week, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi answered that his government has located what is termed as “an Alqa’ida Cell” in southern part of the country, in Oromia regional state, and that they would be dealt with harshly.
The HRLHA is highly concerned that this violence is wide spreading from day to day, and is engulfing almost all parts of the country, adding to the chronic socio-economic and political instabilities that the country has been caught in for the past twenty years. This is also a good reminder of TPLF/EPRDF’s typical behaviors during parliamentary election times. The HRLHA calls up on the Ethiopian TPLD/EPRDF lead government to immediately refrain from interfering in religious affairs of the citizens of the country in violation of the religious freedoms provided in the country’s constitution of 1995 Article 11/3 which states “ The state shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs”. And the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 18/1,2 which states (“ 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”). Which Ethiopia is signatory since 1993
HRLHA also calls up on local, regional, and international diplomatic and religious communities and agencies to join hands in condemning such deadly acts of violence by the Ethiopian government, and demanding its immediate halt. HRLHA also calls up on the international communities and civic organizations to bring their voices together in requesting the immediate and unconditional release of the thousands of Muslim worshipers who have been detained since the eruption of this violence.
HRLHA has managed, through its local correspondents; to obtain the names of the following alleged members and/or supporters of terrorist organizations submitted to the South Showa zone (Waliso) administrative and intelligence office on April 29, 2012 by the local mosque official together with some details of their situations.
Ethiopia is a police state, where journalists are branded as “terrorists” and jailed – over 200 so far. It has only ONE national radio station, ONE national television station, ONE national daily for 83m people, ONE internet server. Private broadcasts are JAMMED.
PM Meles Zenawi turned out to be worse than the brutal dictator, Col Mengistu he ousted back in 1991. Zenawi practices ethnic (Tigrayan) apartheid. #Ethiopia
He rigged the 2005 elections. When people protested, security forces killed over 500, injured 800+ and arrested over 40,000.
Same thing happened in 2010 elections, where Zenawi’s party won 96.4% of the vote. The opposition won just one seat in the 547-seat parliament.
And Ethiopia is the country where the African Union keeps its headquarters in Addis Ababa, from where it preaches democracy and freedom of expression to the rest of Africa? A country that violates every tenet of the AU’s Charter on Human and Peoples Rights?
Article 9 of the AU’s own Charter guarantees FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. Protests are a form of freedom of expression. http://bit.ly/Jhedhv What’s the point of having an organization that CANNOT enforce its own rules or charter?
A den of kleptocrats and dictators, the AU can’t even define “democracy.” There is no election in Africa that it doesn’t like; all are “free and fair.”
Name one crisis the AU has been able to resolve without appealing for international aid. Congo? Libya? Somalia? Sudan? Zimbabwe?
In Sudan, when AU troops came under sustained rebel assault in Haskanita near Darfur, in Oct 2007, they FLED – like the Malian soldiers.
Ethiopians should end this tomfoolery and buffoonery. OCCUPY the new AU Headquarters built by China and SHUT IT DOWN – until ALL journalists and political prisoners are released before the next AU Summit in June.
The expulsion of the AU from Ethiopia would be the GREATEST SERVICE Ethiopians can do for Africa – comparable to the great achievements of Nkrumah and Mandela.
The expulsion will shake the very foundations of kleptocracy and dictatorship across Africa and spark the SECOND LIBERATION of Africa.
Ethiopia’s PM Zenawi gets a cool $2+bn in Western aid as an “ally in the war on terrorism.” Too fatuous. Does the West ever learn? #Ethiopia
Zenawi couldn’t find enough terrorists in Somalia, so he turned on journalists and critics, labeling them “terrorists.” Paranoia and hallucination have set in.
Unless Ethiopians kick out the AU, their future will remain bleak. In the past half CENTURY, Ethiopia has had just 3 heads of state: Selassie, Mengistu and Zenawi. The first two were removed from office VIOLENTLY – military coup and rebel insurgency. How do you think Zenawi, after 21 years in power via rigged elections, will be removed from power?
The wise learn from the mistakes of others while fools repeat them. Idiots, on the other hand, repeat their own stupid mistakes.
A vortex of climate change and rising population threatens Ethiopia’s gains in feeding itself
By Carl Neustaedter, The Ottawa Citizen
Ethiopians from the township of Feji Goba pick up bags of maize they receive through an emergency food assistance program in Shashemene, Ethiopia, after prolonged droughts affected their crops. The relief program is funded by the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and its partners, February 3, 2012.
Photograph by: Carl Neustaedter , The Ottawa Citizen
SHASHEMENE, Ethiopia — Abdala Wahilo finds relief from the midday sun under the corrugated metal roof of a warehouse in Shashemene, a town not far from the farm where he tries to support a family of 12 on a single hectare of land. Here, at this emergency food aid distribution centre, he also finds some relief from the hunger that his family has faced in the last few years as repeated droughts have ravaged this region in southern Ethiopia.
“We don’t want aid,” he says, waving at the wall of maize bags and plastic jugs of cooking oil that will provide basic rations to his family and more than 26,000 other people in the area. “We want to work and support ourselves.”
But without aid, his children eat at most twice a day and he and his wife only once, so Abdala says he’s thankful for the help. And he’s seen what happens without it: Last year, when the worst drought in decades hit, so many people in this area became malnourished that feeding centres were set up for children and pregnant women. To survive the past few years, he also had to sell most of his livestock, which had produced milk and butter he sold to raise money for food and school fees. Some of his children had to suspend their studies.
A vortex of population growth, land scarcity and a changing climatehas wrenched Shashemene and much of densely populated south-central Ethiopia from an area that produced food surpluses less than a decade ago to a place where food aid is regularly needed. But the country as a whole has made steady progress in reducing poverty and blunting the impact of droughts since the devastating famine of 1984. And, at eight per cent, it has one of the highest economic growth rates in Africa, if not the world.
Still, there’s much more to do. After all, Ethiopia ranks 174th of 187 on the UN’s human development index, which measures income, education and life expectancy. It’s one of the world’s top aid recipients, and around a tenth of its people, like Abdala, needs some kind of food assistance each year.
Asked if getting a handout hurts his pride, Abdala pauses, then says: “I am happy because my children aren’t starving.”
And with that, he hoists a 50-kilogram bag of maize on his back and heads out of the warehouse, back into the dusty lot where hundreds of others await their ration, back into the hot February sun that he prays will give way soon to the spring rains.
Ethiopia is a frustrating paradox to its many western aid donors, including Canada, which put more than $176 million into development projects here in 2011.
On the one hand, the regime is often in the headlines for jailing members of opposition parties and journalists — it’s not surprising it won all but one of 546 seats in the last election two years ago — and, more recently, for a Human Rights Watch report condemning the relocation of tens of thousands of citizens to allow Chinese and Indian companies to set up massive commercial farms to produce export crops. On the other hand, many aid groups laud the government for a commitment to poverty reduction that is far greater than many African countries.
“In Ethiopia, you actually see a government … that’s committed to try and make a difference,” says Jim Cornelius, director of theCanadian Foodgrains Bank, an aid and development agency that’s worked in Ethiopia since the 1984 famine. “A lot of progress has been made in the country.”
The most obvious sign of progress is that droughts and other “shocks” like food price spikes no longer cause full-blown famines — there’s hunger, yes, but not death on the grand scale that burned itself into our collective consciousness in 1984. There’s now an early-warning system for food crises, and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program creates public works projects to help more than seven million chronically vulnerable people. From road repairs to terracing and replanting the country’s eroded hillsides, at-risk farmers work in exchange for food or the cash to buy it. (To avoid dependency on handouts the Ethiopian government stipulates that, except in emergencies, food aid is never given without work in return.) When drought hits areas not covered by the program, emergency aid kicks in. Last year, 3.2 million Ethiopians got emergency food aid to supplement their own reserves.
The paradox of repression and development stems from the same source: The regime’s almost total control over its citizens and the economy. From the control of land tenure — citizens cannot buy or sell land — to the distribution of seeds and fertilizer, the government reaches deeply into the lives of most Ethiopians. Once ruled by an emperor who controlled all the land, then by a highly centralized communist regime in the 1970s and ’80s, the country’s current government, led by longtime Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, models itself on the highly controlled state capitalism of China, its biggest trading partner.
Meles, heading to Camp David next week at U.S. President Barack Obama’s invitation, will be one of four African leaders discussing food security with G8 leaders. Although he’s reviled as a despot by his detractors, he gets a lot of slack from western donors and allies because he runs a safe and stable country amid the chaos of Somalia to the east and the warring Sudans to the west.
As the World Economic Forum in Addis Ababa wrapped up on Friday, aid activist and Irish pop star Bob Geldof urged Prime Minister Meles to be more inclusive and tolerant of civil society groups. "If they keep saying 'you can't write anything critical,' they're in trouble," Geldof said. "Have them participate, allow the pressure valve to come off."
More than $3.5 billion (U.S.) in aid rolled into Ethiopia last year, but it’s buying less and less influence with the Meles regime, which plays geopolitics to its advantage.
“The weight of development aid in terms of influence on the Ethiopian government has been decreasing and has been on the wane for a number of years,” says Nicolas Moyer of the Humanitarian Coalition, a network of five major Canadian aid and development agencies that works in Ethiopia and around the world. “The increasing presence of Chinese investments on the private sector side has largely decreased the influence of the development donors on the Ethiopian government’s thinking and strategy.”
The Ethiopian government may hold most of the cards in controlling the country’s destiny, but with it comes the responsibility of feeding 90 million people.
Driving south from Addis Ababa to the country’s most densely populated areas, that challenge comes into sharp focus.
The smooth, black highway that cuts through the dry season’s palette of dusty browns and beiges is lined with Ethiopians on foot, carrying water in bright yellow jerry cans or driving heavily laden carts pulled by stoic donkeys. What’s missing here? Trucks carrying goods and raw materials, the stuff of commerce. That, says Cornelius, shows how little economic activity there is here beyond farming. Not only does this limit Ethiopians’ ability to work off the farm for extra income in bad times, he says, it limits their diet to what they can grow themselves since many can’t afford to buy other types of food. And in the big picture, it means that as the population grows and everyone’s parcel of land gets smaller, there isn’t enough opportunity for farmers, much less their children.
“We have to do something about moving people from the land to livelihoods that may still be related to an agrarian economy,” says Foodgrains Bank field representative Sam Vander Ende, who’s lived in Ethiopia for more than 18 years. “But the peasant livelihood isn’t going to get us there.”
The highway winds past a vast greenhouse complex, more than two kilometres long in all, where up to 10,000 day labourers are employed growing roses for European markets. It’s evidence of the government’s recent, and controversial, push for large scale commercial agriculture that brings in much needed foreign currency.
Still, the vast majority of people remain on the land. The poorest families in south-central Ethiopia subsist on less than a hectare of land — many on much, much less.
Thomas Tora, a farmer in the Damot Woyde area, has only an eighth of a hectare (about the size of an NHL hockey rink) on which to support his family of six. Even in a good year, that’s not enough to feed everyone. Last year’s drought left his children malnourished to the point that they couldn’t stand up, he says, much less go to school — which he couldn’t afford anyway. He left his village to gather wood to sell in an effort to make ends meet. Eventually the Foodgrains Bank and its local partners set up a relief program, and a government food-for-work program also assisted him and thousands of nearby villagers in the same situation.
Asked if he would move to an area with more or better land, Thomas, shakes his head under a tattered ball cap. “I am too weak to go,” he says, explaining that he has health problems. But among his neighbours there’s wary enthusiasm for resettlement.
“Everyone would be willing to go,” says Zewdie Zebdewos, the chairman of the local township where Thomas lives. “But they are worried about the land and about malaria.” Many people here live higher up in the hills where malaria can’t stalk their children or their livestock. Arable land in low-lying areas often goes unfarmed.
Resettlement of any kind, large or small, is a hot button topic. Beyond the current controversy over accusations of forced resettlements, memories of the former communist regime’s disastrous mass relocations are as close as the tractors rusting on abandoned collective farms. Canada — and many other western donors — won’t fund anything tied to resettlement efforts or commercial farming.
But there is a recognition that something has to be done to deal with the scarcity of land in densely populated places if Ethiopia is to become self-sufficient.
“The country does need to be looking at how it can develop its land, and it should be making land available to those who don’t have lands,” says Cornelius of the Foodgrains Bank. “The critical thing is that it’s voluntary and there does need to be accompanying services provided to make it viable.”
Too often, he says, people have been resettled to areas with insufficient roads, schools and health care.
With land tenure firmly in the government’s control, migration to cities has also been held firmly in check, observes Moyer of the Humanitarian Coalition.
“The current system keeps rural populations in rural areas,” he says. “If you did open up land title, then land would start to be sold and more families would start to move to cities.” The government prefers slow urbanization, adds Moyer, who lived in Ethiopia for three years. It wants to avoid the experience of other developing countries where migration spawned slums, dire poverty and crime.
With such limited mobility, Ethiopians have few options.
“You have a huge, burgeoning population of people who don’t feel they have any control over their destiny,” observes Vander Ende. “It’s in the hands of God, it’s in the hands of the federal government, it’s in the hands of the local government … it’s in the hands of (aid agencies like) Canadian Foodgrains Bank.”
“Ethiopia struggles with promoting small-scale and community-led development where Ethiopians could set up small businesses, improve their farming practices and be part of the solutions themselves,” says Moyer. “Ethiopians don’t feel part of the solution. The state has always been the source of their livelihood.”
A few hours’ drive from Shashemene’s travails, the farmers in a small township in the Kutcha district do feel part of the solution to chronic food shortages.
In fact, they no longer need food aid.
The villagers in Dana resettled here voluntarily in the dying days of the communist era, three ethnic groups speaking three languages, tossed together in a forest of snakes, the occasional lion, and no services. Life was very tough: clearing land, eking out a living from nothing. It’s reminiscent of the hardships faced by the settlers of the Canadian West, observes Cornelius, who runs the Foodgrains Bank from Winnipeg. Its biggest supporters are the farmers who work the Prairies today, people who know something about the vagaries of weather and working the land.
Today, Dana is a different place.
Cellphone in hand, farmer Oych Yaya walks along a ditch that catches water from a nearby river, hops up onto the edge of a concrete trough, and follows it to the other end, where the water flows into his own patch of insurance against unpredictable rains: One-quarter hectare of irrigated land that all but guarantees at least two good crops a year.
More than 230 of his neighbours got the same opportunity three years ago when they dug the channels for this water diversion project funded by the Foodgrains Bank.
Today, Oych is earning cash for the first time by selling surplus crops such as onions, peppers and bananas. He can now afford to pay fees and boarding costs so his seven children can go to school in Selamber, the district town. For years, their education was interrupted whenever droughts made paying fees impossible. His cellphone helps him track prices in nearby market towns so he can get good prices for his crops.
While aid agencies and the government take on similar irrigation projects and promote more productive ways of farming around the country, development experts say Ethiopia is not making the most of its land. According to government statistics, 740,000 of its 1.2 million square kilometres is arable, but only 150,000 square kilometres is being cultivated.
“The agricultural potential is there,” says Moyer. Despite being home to the source of the Nile and being the ‘water tower of Africa,’ he adds, only a small percentage of the arable land is irrigated. And because farmers do not have tenure over the land and plots are rotated between them every few years, he says, they don’t invest as much as they could in the land. “Everybody knows they won’t have the same land 10 years from now, so there’s a lot less investment in terms of how to maximize the use of the land, whether it’s irrigation … or being able to use your land as collateral to get credit.”
In the meantime, Ethiopians find ways to survive lean periods.
“People have been facing hunger for centuries, for generations,” says Vander Ende. “And one thing that Ethiopians excel in is survival skills. They know what to do.” While aid is sometimes needed, he says, it’s “at best only a supplement” to generations-old coping strategies and survival skills.
These include planting “famine crops” such as enset — often called false banana due to its appearance — whose roots can be eaten when other crops fail. In good times, families build up assets such as livestock, which can be sold in lean times. And there is a strong tradition of villagers banding together to help one another. There are even specific terms for each kind of mutual assistance; afoosha, idir and iqub refer to groups that look after social functions, funerals and rotating credit and savings associations.
Building on these traditions, local development agencies are now helping women, who often have little say in community affairs, create self-help groups of their own. Since 2008, the women of the village of Sere Belaka have been meeting weekly under the shade of a grove of trees overlooking a spectacular valley, each taking her turn to lead the group, building her confidence. Each week, each member contributes one birr (about five cents) to the group. The women, all illiterate and most living on half-hectare farms, explain that the idea of pooling their savings was a revelation that has made a sizable change in their lives. The women have used the money to buy sheep and resell them at higher prices, fatten up and butcher an ox to sell, and stockpile maize until prices rise. With their earnings, they helped one mother get medical help for her son who’d broken his arm, contributed to church and home construction and invested in members’ micro-businesses such as bee-keeping. And it sure beats going to the moneylenders. As one woman explained, being able to pay school fees was the best insurance of all: The women want their children to get an education, get good jobs and be able to take care of them in their old age.
“No matter what community you’re in, parents want their kids to be in school,” says Moyer. “They are limited in their options in subsistence agriculture. Most, if not all, see the way out through education.”
In Shashemene, the rains Abdala Wahilo prayed for in February didn’t come — at least not in time. And by the time any moisture hit the ground in late April it was too late for most farmers like him, who count on the “short rains” for crops that will feed them until the major crops are harvested.
“The short rainy season has effectively been a writeoff,” reports Vander Ende, noting that the season’s crops provide crucial food during the “hunger gap” between the main growing seasons. In recent weeks rains have come to some areas, and Vander Ende says that may help some farmers prepare ground for planting main crops in June.
“We’re on a knife-edge here,” he says, “seeing if we can salvage something from this very, very late rain.”
There’s not much they or anyone else can do about the weather, not even the ever-present Ethiopian government. And the forecast is worrisome.
FEWSNET, a famine early warning system funded by USAID, released two reports in April that don’t bode well for the people of south-central Ethiopia, where so much of the population lives.
In the Wolayta area, not far from Shashemene, FEWSNET reported that the sweet potato harvest was a “near complete failure,” food prices were rising, as were admissions of severely malnourished children to feeding programs and “stabilization centres.”
“Increased sale of livestock and firewood, consumption of immature enset and migration to towns in search of labour are being reported by poor households,” the report says. “Given such outcomes, thousands of poor and very poor households in these parts of the region are currently experiencing a food security crisis.”
The second report looked at the long-term climate trend. For many areas of the country, FEWSNET says, the outlook is good, with rainfall expected to keep farms productive. That, it says, is likely going to be needed to offset the problems facing south central Ethiopia where farmers like Abdala and the women of Sere Belaka can expect a drier future. The report concludes:
- Rains in this part of Ethiopia have decreased 15 to 20 per cent since the mid 1970s.
- Rising temperatures are making dry conditions even worse.
- The drop in rainfall is happening in the country’s most populated and fast-growing areas, creating conditions that “could dramatically increase the number of at-risk people in Ethiopia during the next 20 years.”
Whether it’s called climate change or not, says Moyer, the reality on the ground looks the same to the people living there.
“Whereas these regions may have seen severe droughts every five years and catastrophic ones every 10 years, we’re seeing them sometimes back-to-back,” he says. “If you’re going to face two months of severe drought and a potential famine situation where you can’t access food, if you have to sell off your livestock or your key household assets, you’re going to be worse off for a long period and may be even less equipped to deal with the next crisis that comes.”
For Cornelius, that’s where relief comes in.
And go ahead, he says, call it a Band-aid solution.
“We have Band-aids for a very good reason,” he says. “We need to cover wounds so they don’t get infected and lead to bigger problems.
“We strongly feel that providing immediate relief is essential for dealing with the immediate crisis, but it also makes a huge difference in the long term. If you don’t provide relief and the family takes their kids out of school, that’s compromising the future.”
For many Ethiopians, the future is measured by the next meal, the next crop, the next rainfall. The longer term solutions, are, for the most part, out of their work-weary hands.
Djibouti: destitution and fear for refugees from Ethiopia
The following report is from the Oromia Support Group (OSG), a non-political organisation which attempts to raise awareness of human rights violations in Ethiopia. OSG has now reported 4407 extra-judicial killings and 992 disappearances of civilians in Ethiopia. Hundreds of thousands have been placed in illegal detention, where torture and rape are commonplace. To read the full report (pdf format), please click here.
Djibouti: destitution and fear for refugees from Ethiopia
Oromia Support Group Report 48 | May 2012
Summary Refugees from Ethiopia and officials of NGOs and governments were interviewed in Somaliland and Djibouti in November and December 2011. Formal interviews with 43 refugees, including 26 in Djibouti, confirmed other reports that a high proportion of refugees from Ethiopia have been tortured.
Twenty one of the 43 interviewees (49%), including eight of the 26 interviewed in Djibouti, had been tortured. Every male former detainee (17) and four out of six female former detainees had been tortured – 91% of 23 former detainees.
At least four of the six female former detainees were serially and multiply raped. Three more, two when aged 11-14, were raped by Ethiopian security forces in or near their homes.
Interviewees reported 34 killings of close relatives and friends by Ethiopian security forces and the deaths of 94 in horrific circumstances in detention. One gave an eye-witness account of the Weter massacre, where he reported 1000 were shot dead in 1992.
There are several hundred registered asylum-seekers in Djibouti city and several thousand undocumented immigrants from Ethiopia. Registration, which was resumed for new applicants in 2010, affords a degree of protection from police roundups and the threat of deportation to Ethiopia. Refoulement of large numbers of registered asylum-seekers and UNHCR mandate refugees is now less common, due to better training of the Djibouti police by UNHCR.
However, refoulement of at least 25 Oromo and Ogadeni asylum-seekers and refugees occurred between November 2010 and January 2011. Eye-witness accounts corroborate claims that these men and women were abducted by snatch squads consisting of Djibouti and Ethiopian security forces.
UNHCR acknowledges that some were taken but believes reports by Djibouti police that only members of armed opposition groups were arrested and deported. Evidence provided by eye-witnesses and acquaintances of those refouled is not consistent with this belief. UNHCR does not appreciate the risk of abduction and refoulement for refugees who have no association with Ethiopian opposition groups, nor the associated fear that is part of their daily lives.
Asylum-seekers in Djibouti city lead a marginal existence, due to high unemployment and exploitation of cheap casual labour. Xenophobic and sexual violence is commonly reported in the city and in the area of Ali Addeh refugee camp, where most of the few hundred Ethiopian mandated refugees live. Two women reported three incidents of rape, including two of gang-rape in Djibouti city.
The sluggish refugee status determination process badly needs overhauling in Djibouti. Very few asylum-seekers achieve refugee status and therefore the assistance available in Ali Addeh camp or the slim chance of being considered for resettlement in a third country.
The factors that lead people to leave their homes, communities and lands in search of safety are complex. Repression, social violence, armed conflict, poverty and forced displacement co-exist and reinforce each other. The immediate cause of flight is almost always the danger of human rights abuse. …
The growing number of refugees is neither a temporary problem nor the random product of chance events. It is the predictable consequence of human rights crises, the result of decisions made by individuals who wield power over people’s lives. If governments did their job – if they protected their citizens instead of persecuting them – then those in exile could return home safely, and no more men, women and children would have to gamble on an uncertain future in a foreign land.
- Amnesty International. Refuge! Africa. In search of safety: The forcibly displaced and human rights in Africa. Index AFR 01/05/97. London. June 1997 (pp.1 and 6).
Unity of Purpose to Empower Oromian Liberation Forces for Victory
Fayyis Oromia
As I tried to describe in my last opinion, the Oromo nation is in a liberation struggle against the Abyssinian colonizers, who are supported by their handlers from both power players of the Eastern and the Western world. This fighting for freedom from the proxy colonial forces (from the Abyssinian ruling elites) is continuing in multiple forms: diplomatically, militarily and politically. In this globe, where politics gives more value to the principle of the survival of the fittest, because of the fact that only 'might is right', there is no other alternative to empowering the Oromo people, if we are really serious about getting bilisummaa/freedom from the oppressors and achieve national walabummaa/sovereignty to determine our destiny. One of the ways to strengthen our nation is by forging the necessary unity of purpose between all Oromian liberation forces. What is this unity of purpose, how can we define it operationally?
James Wilson once defined unity of purpose as the blending of primary and derivative responsibilities into a common pursuit. Alexander Hamilton said that securing such unity of purpose, coupled with the desire to make a difference, would generate the necessary energy to assure every nation's liberty and stability. In effect, Wilson's unity of purpose represents a central component of the American constitutional form. In the process of showing the importance of unity of purpose, he asserts that humanity is driven forward by the tension between those who upon viewing order create disorder and those who upon viewing disorder create order. In a conflict between these two diametrically opposite forces, unity of purpose can help those who want to create order/unity to have an essential victory over those who do the opposite. To indicate the very importance of such unity, the current president of the UNO also once told to the African leaders in certain AU leaders' submit: "through unity of purpose, I believe there is no limit to what we can achieve."
From these important sentences said by the above prominent personalities, we can see how relevant the national or supra-national unity of purpose is. Oromo nationalists, who are conscious about the importance of such unity, already started to describe this unity of purpose as 'tokkummaa for bilisummaa' = unity for freedom. The main thing, which the Oromo freedom fighters now desperately need to be successful is such a unity of purpose. We know that unity comes before victory even in a dictionary. That means, we need to have the necessary blending of primary and derivative responsibilities of our freedom fighters into a common pursuit of bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. This blending into a common pursuit through such unity of purpose, coupled with the desire of our people to make a difference, would generate the necessary energy to assure the stability and strength of the Oromo liberation bloc. The strength of the Oromo liberation movement is up to now challenged by the principle put well by Wilson that 'humanity is driven forward by the tension between those who upon viewing order create disorder and those who upon viewing disorder create order'.
These two forces do present also in the Oromo liberation struggle. There are Oromo nationalists who do their best in 'creating order/unity upon viewing disorder/disunity' and we do observe forces from the enemy camp trying to create disorder/division upon viewing order in the Oromo liberation camp. The aims of the two opposing movements are of course antagonistic because of the fact that those who strive to create unity upon viewing division in the Oromo liberation camp do try to strengthen the Oromo freedom fighters, whereas those who attempt to create division upon viewing unity want to weaken the struggle. If these two forces can be differentiated well at least by the Oromo polity, then Oromo nationalists can consciously work on supporting the forces of tokkummaa for bilisummaa in order to empower the Oromian liberation camp against the Abyssinian colonization/domination camp, i.e. against the giant evil, which could develop to be such a big oppressor because of the massive support it gets from those who formed and are keeping the Ethiopian empire as an instrument designed to serve their own interest in the Horn region.
The main two forces we do now see struggling in Oromia and/or Ethiopia in such sense of creating disunity or unity are the Abyssinian forces, who do everything under the sun to weaken Oromo's power by using the divide-and-destroy method and the Oromian forces, who try to fix this problem of discord in the Oromo liberation movement with the purpose of strengthening the Oromo people. No question that to be liberated, the Oromo nation must be a force/humna. For this potentially great nation to be humna, it is fact that tokkummaa of the Oromo liberation forces is necessary. The tokkummaa we need should not necessarily be structural unity so that all liberation forces be in one stronger organization, as we used to dream and wish, but surely the unity of purpose among all the Oromo liberation organizations is mandatory and a must. The main principle used by the Abyssinian camp to hinder the Oromo nation from being such a humna is as mentioned above by sowing a discord and using the colonial method of divide-to-destroy.
To that effect particularly the Woyane cadres do apply the so called 'AME principle': the acronym standing for antagonize-moralize-emotionalize. Nowadays, they do try to antagonize the two goals envisioned by the OLF, even though we know that one of the goals will prevail based on the future decision of the Oromo public per referendum: ‘Oromian autonomy within Ethiopian union' vs 'Oromian independence within African union’. Furthermore both kaayyoo’s are not antagonistic to each other for the fact that the first kaayyoo is a very good prelude to the second. The cadres go on and try to moralize (paint as if Oromian autonomy is bad like a devil and Oromian independence is good like a divinity or vice versa). After moralizing the two goals like this, they further try to emotionalize (try to manipulate the Oromo nationals, so that we do develop an immense hatred against an Oromian autonomy and of course have an enthusiastic love towards Oromian independence or the reverse).
Regarding such move of the Woyane cadres to create division upon viewing order, the main areas of operation observed in the last 20 years of their rule are: the Amhara-Oromo divide, where they do try to make sure that these two camps never find a common denominator and forge a sort of alliance against their regime; the Amhara-Amhara conflict, where they try to hinder the andinet/unity of the Amhara camp, which can challenge their power in Finfinne palace; and the Oromo-Oromo discord, where they try to do everything under the sun to avoid any sort of tokkummaa in the Oromo liberation camp, which not only can take over power in Finfinne, but also liberate the whole Oromia from the Abyssinian domination forces. Oromo nationalists in particular and all the anti-Woyane forces in general should try to neutralize this malicious action of the Woyane by promoting the Oromo-Oromo tokkummaa, by not opposing the Amhara-Amhara andinet and by being open for the possible Amhara-Oromo tibibbir/alliance/tumsa. It is clear that the forces who want to create disorder/diviosn/disunity upon viewing order are doing their job in the Oromo liberation camp continuously and untiredly. But why do the forces of order/tokkummaa/unity not have such diligence and try their best to deal with these destructive forces of disorder?
To illustrate, the importance of the unity of purpose among the Oromo liberation fronts, let me use the following metaphor by applying the five colors used in the faajjii’s/flags of Abbaa-Gadaa and OLF to represent the possible five steps and stages needed to move from the state of suffering under colony towards the future optimal bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. To move from the colonial “Ethiopian unity” of the Abyssinian elites to the free Oromian union envisioned by the Oromo nationalists, these five steps and can be undertaken or the five stages can be achieved one after the other. Just to categorize some Organizations and to give them certain political color, we need to divide the karaa/xurree bilisummaa (the roadmap of the Oromo liberation movement) in to five blocs or stages and paint each of them with the five colors:
- the first bloc/part/stage of the roadmap is colored with white, symbolically the phase of the Ginbot-7′s unitary Ethíopia devoid of Oromia, but have respecting Oromo people’s national right for freedom/bilisumma at heart, which is the same to what the OLF being acitve (for example) in ME’ISON tried to achieve and now considered as an obsolete political move and belongs to the past. We have already travelled this bloc or moved up to this first stage till 1991.
- the second part or stage is colored with yellow, which represents the status quo, the present Woyane’s evil and temporary pseudo-federalism, where in reality Oromia is under occupation of the Woyane forces, but where the OLF is doing its job infiltrating (for instance) the instrumental OPDO and try to keep the already achieved minimum political victories from set back.
- the third part/stage is the future short-term goal of the Oromo liberation movement in the form of true Oromian autonomy (genuine killil-federation) as planned by the OLF operating (for example) in Group-7 and this bloc can be painted with the green color.
- the fourth part/stage of the roadmap can be given the red color and it is the middle-term goal of the Oromo liberation movement; i.e an Oromian independence, which is indispensable and envisioned by the OLF operating (for instance) in the ULFO.
- the final, optimal, highest and fifth part/stage is represented by the black color, which symbolizes Oromian union (supra-national union of independent nations in the Horn region) as a long-term goal which is necessary to unite all Oromo in the Horn from Meroe to Mombaasa. As far as I know, the OLF didn’t yet explicitly stress this final move as a goal.
Whereas we have certain Oromo organizations claiming to be in exclusively green and red uniform, none of the structurally existing Oromo liberation forces seems to be exclusively and explicitly in black uniform, even though all do have the potential to be; here again black being the final and lasting goal which can serve the interest of all the stakeholders in the Horn region. This stepwise move from one stage/bloc to the next/highest level is like the liberation journey from garbummaa under the Amhara rule till 1991 in a symbolical Djibouti (white) and from the border town of Ayisha (yellow) representing the status quo under Woyane —– through Oromian autonomy symbolized by Diredhawa (green) —– and through Oromian independence represented by a move to Adama (red) —– to the final goal in the form of Oromian union, which is given the symbol of arriving at Finfinne (black).
This liberation journey first towards Diredhawa, then to Adama and at the end to Finfinne is the optimal and progressive move, in which all Oromo freedom fighters can take part. All of them can wear together yellow uniform for the sake of hindering any possible backward and regressive move to Djibouti, the backward move for which almost all Amhara forces do struggle. Then, all of the Oromo freedom fighters can have green uniform to move together to Diredhawa followed by changing the uniform to red in order to push further towards Adama, and finally all these nationalists can together put on black uniform to move to Finfinne, the most beneficial type of Oromian sovereignty.
Here, we can clearly see how wrongly we usually do categorize both the Ginbot-7 and the Group-7 in one camp. In reality, Ginbot-7 wants us to move from the status quo regressively backwards to the white area, whereas the Group-7 tries to help us progressively move from the yellow position forwards to the green zone. Actually Oromo nationalists in the exclusively red uniform (pro-independence forces) could move with the Group-7, who are now wearing green (pro-autonomy forces), forwards to the next bloc of the roadmap and then challenge the convincingly green nationals, not to hinder the further move of the Oromo nation to the red zone. At the end, if it will be in the interest of the Oromo people, nothing can inhibit us from the final move to the black part of the roadmap (to the position of the pro-union forces). Very important in fostering the imperative unity of purpose among the Oromo liberation organizations is to be conscious that a genuine and true 'Oromian autonomy within Ethiopian union' is a best prelude for an 'Oromian independence within African union'. Thus, through resisting both the white and the yellow Abyssinian forces and being open to support the move of the OLF towards both the green and the red blocs, Oromo nationalists can harmoniously struggle together.
That is why I do think that the currently ongoing way of alienating the Group-7, which is actually the frank attempt of the OLF to exclusively move to the green zone, from the other Oromo freedom fighters, serves only the evil intention of those who want to weaken the unity of purpose in the Oromo liberation camp. Of course, indisputably clear is that to minimize such opposition of some Oromo nationalists against the move of the Group-7, actually also its partner, the Ginbot-7, should have changed its program towards accepting the true killil federation in a process of forging the alliance between these two respective Amhara and Oromo forces. Otherwise, to understand why we should in unison support the progressive moves to both the green and the red zones, we can see that even alaabaa of the OLF is a combination of green (pro-autonomy move) and red (pro-independence move) illustrating the fact that the OLF is by nature inclusive of the two goals, on which the Oromo public will have a referendum at the right time in the future.
Furthermore, important to consider regarding the Oromo national liberation movement is the significance of allowing our mind-set of bilisummaa (the OLF) to move in all directions and areas by using different factions and rhetoric as mere instruments. The move of this mind-set in a structural (organizational) form of OPDO, OFC, OLF-JJ (Group-7), OLF-QC, OLF-SG and ULFO must be recognized, accepted and respected by all the reasonable and seasoned Oromo nationalists with sound mind. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the different approaches of the OLF operating in these structural Oromo liberation forces, as our foes want to see it and want to make us believe. The move of the OLF, be it tactical or strategical, using these different names is not as such contradictory, but complementary. These different structural organizations of the OLF, who ought to have the imperative unity of purpose, is necessary for the Oromo nation to come to the kaayyoo (purpose) of bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. Beside the unity of purpose, some other factors, which are necessary to empower Oromo nation against Abyssinian colonizers are: our commitment and dedication to sacrifice our talent, money and time for the kaayyoo; our efforts to strengthen the military wing of our movement, the OLA (Oromo Liberation Army) as the only means for the Oromo nation to get respect in the world, where survival of the fittest is the rule of the game; our possibly smart diplomacy to get more international support for our cause; and our internal strength not to be influenced by the pressure from the enemy camp.
Last but not least, it is not only the use of unity of purpose to empower Oromo freedom fighters what is necessary, but also knowing the vice versa, i.e. empowering Oromian liberation forces can lead to the consolidation of the necessary tokkummaa for bilisummaa. That means, another way of uniting the Oromo liberation camp is just helping one of the OLF structural organizations be stronger, so that the forces in the weaker structures will be attracted towards the stronger one and this stronger OLF structure can be the core of empowering our nation. So let us all Oromo nationals be ready to join one structural liberation organization, which we think can fit our belief and then let's contribute our best to the Oromo's unity of purpose through strengthening where possible the structural unity of the OLF, if not the spiritual unity of purpose between the existing multiple structures. In this way, we can at least materialize the spiritual unity of all Oromo nationalists with the mind-set of bilisummaa, which we can take as unity of purpose. Such unity of purpose is indispensable, if we want that at the end of the day Oromian freedom fighters have victory on the Abyssinian colonizers. Only when we do create such unity of purpose, the Oromo people can boldly assert like the UNO president did: through unity of purpose, there is no limit to what we can achieve. May Rabbi/Waaqa help Oromian liberation forces be empowered through our unity of purpose (through tokkummaa for bilisummaa) and help us come out victorious over the Abyssinian colonizers.
According to EthioMedia, a delegate of Group-7 (the recently created "new OLF") will hold a meeting with its Ethiopian fans in the capital city of Canada, Ottawa, over the weekend (May 5, 2012).
Part of the mission of the delegation of Group-7 to Ottawa, Canada, according to an unconfirmed source from Toronto, is to lay the groundwork for the takeover of the Oromo Sports Federation in North America (OSFNA) by an Ethiopian Sports Federation. According to this source, OSFNA had been deliberately weakened and made irrelevant over the last three years - attracting less and less number of people each year - as "part and parcel" of the ultimate takeover of OSFNA by an Ethiopian Sports Federation. Read More
Open letter to: His Excellency Mr. Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament His Excellency Mr. José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission His Excellency Mr. Van Rompuy, President of the European Council 1049 Brussels, Belgium
25 April 2012
Dear President,
We, the members of Oromo Community Organizations in Europe and citizens of the European Union would like to bring to your attention the escalating violations of human rights being committed by the government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan minority regime against the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia. The Oromo country, Oromia, was conquered and colonized by Abyssinian kings during the European scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century. During the last 130 years the rulers of the Ethiopian state have been oppressing the Oromo people and exploiting the rich natural resources of Oromia. The excessive exploitation of their resources and the oppressive policies of Ethiopian rulers have successively reduced the Oromo to one of the most impoverished and terrorized indigenous African peoples. We would like to point out that military, financial and diplomatic assistance from Western countries has been crucial in maintaining the Ethiopian rulers’ domination over the Oromo people. Regrettably, this trend has continued even under the present Ethiopian regime.
Violation of human rights under the present Ethiopian government
The government of Meles Zenawi started its rule by imprisoning thousands of Oromos introducing large concentration camps for the first time in Ethiopian history. In 1993, it incarcerated over 40,000 men, women and children in overcrowded camps where many died from maltreatment by the regime’s security forces, contagious diseases and malaria. International human rights organizations have reported routinely the regime’s gross violation of human rights since the 1990s. Amnesty International has documented thousands of Oromo prisoners of conscience during the last twenty years. Extra-judicial killings and “disappearances” (hidden assassinations) of political activists perpetrated by the brutal administration of Meles Zenawi surpass those which occurred under the previous Ethiopian regimes. These atrocities are affecting the Oromo more than any other group in the country because the regime fears the potential political power of the Oromo people; they constitute the single largest population group in Ethiopia. According to reports by local and international humanitarian organizations, the Ethiopian security forces have, in recent years, intensified mass arrests, abductions and imprisonments of Oromo students, and members and leaders of civic organizations. Consequently, thousands of Oromo students have been expelled from various colleges and universities and many have been imprisoned, tortured and killed.
The regime’s serious crackdown on Oromo students started, in fact, in 2003- 2004 when it expelled over 350 of them from the various colleges of the Addis Ababa University (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Since 2005, thousands of Oromo students have been arrested from universities, colleges and secondary schools throughout the regional state of Oromia. According to a recent report compiled by the National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy, Qeeroo, 869 Oromo students have been arrested and detained from April 2011 to the end of March 2012. The repression is escalating and the report shows that 31.2 per cent or 271 of the arrests were made during the first quarter of 2012. As those who are arrested or jailed are not allowed to resume their studies the future of many of these young men and women is destroyed by the repressive policies of the Ethiopian regime. In fact it is not only the livelihoods of these Oromo youths which is destroyed by the anti-Oromo policies of the Meles Zenawi regime, but also their physical wellbeing and lives are also threatened. Indisputable pictorial reports available on websites show that the number of young Oromo men and women killed by the Ethiopian security forces is increasing in tandem with the number of those who are being detained.
Regime’s acts of violence are also intensifying against Oromo civic organizations. It suffices to mention here that the Macca (Macha) Tuulama Association (MTA), which was founded in the early 1960s as a pan-Oromo self-help organization, was repeatedly attacked by the Meles Zenawi regime. To silence the civic voice of the Oromo people, the government of Prime Minister Zenawi has been persecuting the MTA members and leaders. In October 2011, the regime banned the organization alleging links with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a political organization fighting for the political rights of the Oromo people. MTA members and leaders, who were arrested, are still in jail without due process of law; others who escaped detention are in exile. Although the repressive actions of the Ethiopian government are exacerbated in the recent years, lack of complete information from all parts of the country makes what is reported just the tip of an iceberg. Understandably, many Ethiopian journalists are reluctant to report about the regime’s repressive actions for fear of being accused of sympathizing with organizations that the Meles Zenawi regime labels as “terrorists”. Even foreign journalists are not free from such accusations. The case of the two Swedish journalists, who were recently detained, charged and convicted of supporting “terrorism”, reflects the Ethiopian regime’s misguided policies and views on freedom of the press.
Today, the number of political prisoners in Ethiopia is estimated to exceed twenty thousand. Former political prisoners say that over 90 per cent of the inmates in detention centres such as the Qaallitti Jail located a few kilometres south of the capital city are Oromos who are incarcerated for political reasons. Oromo prisoners include teenagers and men over eighty years old. In some cases, some prison inmates are members of the same family and include fathers, children and sometimes even grandchildren.
Land grab and displacement of indigenous peoples from their farmlands
Since 2007, the government of Prime Minister Zeanawi has sold or leased on long-term basis lasting up to 99 years about four million of hectares of the most fertile farm- and pasturelands in Ethiopia to international bidder. The policy is forcibly displacing millions of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands without proper compensation if any. Over a third (36 per cent) of the farmlands is confiscated from indigenous Oromo farmers and pastoralist. The evidence provided by researchers show that Ethiopia’s most productive farmland leased to foreign companies are growing food and biofuel crops for export while millions of the indigenous populations are starving. It works against food security of indigenous peoples such as the Anuak, the Oromo and Gumuz. According to the UN the right to food entails that all people have physical access at all times to sufficient food. The right to adequate food also places obligations on Governments to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food, ensuring that there are no direct violations of people’s physical and economic access to sufficient food to maintain a dignified life. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that (a) everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others and that (b) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. The land policy of the present Ethiopian regime violates the right to food and access to natural resources of which water stand outs. The policy denies the Oromo and the other affected indigenous peoples their human right to property. It has already led to the displacement of the indigenous populations and the disintegration of their families and communities on a large scale. The evidence also shows that large scale land lease for commercial farming by the Ethiopian regime has devastating effects on the environment and the country’s water resources.
Your Excellency
Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of EU’s humanitarian and development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is sad to see that a large proportion of this aid is not used for humanitarian relief and development but for political repression. As pointed out in a report sponsored by Human Rights Watch (2010) billions of euros for development aid are being diverted by the Ethiopian government to conduct political oppression. Forced by political repression and as a result of land grab the number of Oromo and other refugees fleeing from Ethiopia is increasing at a very alarming rate today. What is more alarming is the desperate situation in which these hapless men, women and children find themselves while seeking safety outside their homeland. We are sad to say that many of them die of thirst and hunger while trying to transverse the inhospitable terrains of northeast Africa; many drown while crossing the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea in overcrowded rickety vessels in search of safety haven; many more often fall into the vicious grips of human-traffickers, ‘organ harvesters,’ and rapists. It is outrageous that all of them are victims of a regime that is financially and diplomatically supported by Western democratic states.
Your Excellency,
It is distressing to know that EU’s financial aid to Ethiopia is being used as weapon of suppression against our people. The current Ethiopian regime may present itself as an indispensable regional ally of the West against global terrorism. However, we believe that a government that is terrorizing its own people and rules by tyranny cannot be a dependable ally of democratic states in the war against terrorism. On the contrary, we would like to point out that it is the gross violation of human rights committed by the regime which is contributing to local, regional and global instability.
We, the members of Oromo community organizations in Europe and citizens of the European Union call on your office to use all its diplomatic and economic prerogatives to end the growing repression and escalating human rights violations in Ethiopia. We urge you to put pressure on the Ethiopian government to: • End arrests and extrajudicial killings. • Release political prisoners, unlawfully detained students, civic leaders and professionals. • Repeal the terrorism and press laws that stifle democracy. • Release journalists arrested under the fake pretexts of anti-terrorism. • Respect its own Constitution and allow all the nations, nationalities and peoples of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia to freely exercise their rights of self-determination. • Stop the displacement of peasants and pastoralists from their homes • Stop illegal lease and sale of farm- and pasturelands belonging to the Oromo and other indigenous peoples to local and foreign land grabbers.
We greatly appreciate your attention to the plight of the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia.
Respectfully, Members of the Organizing Committee, Oromo Communities in Europe
1. Dr. Galana Balcha, Chairman; galana.balcha@tele2.se, Sweden 2. Prof. Mekuria Bulcha, Sweden; mekuria.bulcha@mdh.se 3. Dr. Bekele Gabre Mamiam, The Netherlands, b_gebremariam@hotmail.com 4. Dr. Muluneh Oli, Belgium, m.oli@skynet.be 5. Dr. Alemayehu Kumsa, Prague, Czech Republic; alemayehu.kumsa@ff.cuni.cz 6. Mr. Tasfaye Metta, Belgium; tesfayemetta@gmail.com 7. Mr. Mulugeta Mossissa, The Netherlands; abdisa@gmail.com 8. Mr. Immiru Ittanaa, UK; hawweetuu@yahoo.com 9. Dr. Zewdu Lechissa, Switzerland; Lechissazewdu@yahoo.com 10. Mr. Olumaa Aberra, Switzerland; oluma5@yahoo.com 11. Mr. Hundee Dhugasa, Belgium; jajjabee430@gmail.com 12. Mr Immiru Itana, UK; hawetu@yahoo.com
Copy to: His Excellency Mr. Ban K-Moon Secretary-General, United Nations Office of the Secretary General 885 Second Avenue New York, NY 10017
United Nations Development Programme One United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA The African Union PO Box 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, P.O. Box 2500, CH-1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland
Amnesty International, Human Rights Action Centre, 17-25 New Inn Yard, London EC2A 3EA
Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor New York, NY 10118-3299
A Three Days Campaign to bring the Consequences of Land Grabbing and Human Rights Violations in Oromia and Ethiopia to the Attention of the European Union (EU)
Brussels and Antwerp, Belgium, 26-28 April 2012
The three days campaign, conducted in the cities of Brussels and Antwerp by members of Oromo communities in Europe, started on the 26th of April 2012 with a visit made by the Organizing Committee’s delegates consisting of Mr. Mulugeta Mossissa from the Netherland, Professor Mekuria Bulcha from Sweden, Mr. Tesfaye Metta from Belgium and Dr Alemayehu Kumsa from Czech Republic to the European Parliament. The delegates were received by Mr. Marc Jütten, Advisor for External Policies in the Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament, on behalf of the President Mr. Martin Schulz. During the meeting which lasted for an hour the delegates informed Mr. Jütten about the human rights violations in Ethiopia in general and Oromia in particular. The discussions with Mr. Jütten covered various aspects of human rights violations in Ethiopia with a focus on the large-scale land lease to local and international commercial farmers, the eviction of Oromo farmers from their homes and farmlands, and the situation of Oromo refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen.
The delegates also pointed out that the EU’s financial aid and political support to the Ethiopian government is contributing to the suffering of the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia rather than economic development, peace and regional stability. Mr. Jütten promised to deliver the concern of the delegates to Mr. Martin Schulz and to raise the issue to other concerned authorities within the European Parliament.
Letters with similar contents were also delivered to the President of European Council Mr. Van Rompuy and to the President of the European Commission Mr. José Manuel Durão Barroso. Practical diplomatic actions are expected from both offices.
At a demonstration which was held on 27 April from 10:00 to 12:00 o’clock in front of the EU commission, many members of the Oromo communities from different European countries voiced their anger and protest against the ongoing massive land grabbing in Oromia and in the non-Abyssinian regions in Ethiopia, human rights violations, the conditions of Oromo political prisoners, and situation of Oromo refugees. The demonstrators also voiced their disappointment about the misuse of the EU AID by the Ethiopian government as a tool to oppress the Oromo and other peoples in Ethiopia.
On the third day, a comprehensive seminar was resumed in Antwerp at ACV Verbond Antwerpen Nationalestrat 111. Four papers were presented on different themes by scholars and an advocate of human rights. Professor Mekuria Bulcha from Mälardalen University, Sweden, presented papers on two themes: the ‘Political and economic effects of Land grabbing in Oromia’, and ‘Overview of the Historical and Cultural Underpinnings of the Oromo Struggle for National Identity and independence’. And also a paper On Long-Term Effects of Land Grabbing on the Environment’ was also presented.
The human rights advocate and Chairman of the Oromo Support Group (OSG), Dr. Trevor Trueman also presented a well-documented overview of human rights violations in Oromia and Ethiopia and the situation of Oromo refugees in Djibouti and Somaliland. Each presentation was followed by lively debates and the active participation of the audience. The conference was concluded late Saturday evening at 9 o’clock. Participants of the events underlined that the three-day activities should be the beginning of the advocacy campaign on the issues of human rights, land grabbing, on the case of Oromo political prisoners in Ethiopia, and the situation of Oromo refugees at large. A call for future closer cooperation, unity, and action among all participants was made. The participants have also called all Oromos around the globe to follow suit and raise the issues of land grabbing, human rights violations, the plight of Oromo political prisoners, Oromo refugees, and inform the public at large.
Let us do all what we can today!!!
Ad Hoc Coordinating Committee, Oromo Communities in Europe
Oromia-Ethiopia: OLF Press Release – Demand of Muslim Community Part of Overall Demand for Human Rights
April 28, 2012 at 9:26 pm · Gadaa.com
The following is a press release from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
The press release is also available in the following languages: - Afaan Oromoo - Amharic
The Demand of the Muslim Community of Ethiopia is Part of the Overall Demand for Respect of the Rights of the Population from the TPLF/EPRDF Regime
OLF Statement
Gadaa.com
The Muslim community has been demonstrating for sometimes now demanding respect for their religious democratic rights for several consecutive Fridays. Their demand is part of the right of faith guaranteed for anybody. The TPLF/EPRDF regime has been trying to force the Muslims to adopt, against their will, a recent version of a negligible minority interpretation taught by followers of Abdallah el Habashi. The regime is doing this through an imposed Islamic Supreme Council (Majlisul A’alaa). The regime is harassing the majority believers, who demand that the government should not interfere in religious affairs, and that they directly elect their representatives in the Supreme Council.
The repressive regime is applying to the religious institutions the same strategy it uses to control the political organizations of the nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, namely infiltrating its agents/cadres and helping them take control of the activities of the organizations as a whole. Subsequently, these institutions are transformed to the tool of the regime to misrule. The Muslims resist the so-called Islamic Supreme Council that has been so transformed from a body that should guide the Islamic religious affairs to a government agent that is bent on curtailing their rights and directly executing the regime’s detrimental policies. The Muslims insist that, since these current Council Leaders are there as government cadres, they want to elect their own representatives democratically instead.
Reports indicate that those who air this view are harassed under different pretexts. Those who happen to be Oromo are labelled as OLF while others are also given the cloak of their respective nations or nationality political organizations. Those whose ethnic background could not be identified are labelled as ‘al Qa’ida’ agents and treated accordingly. Lately, this has grown into open confrontation with the regime resorting to its favourite tool of suppression, killing peaceful demonstrations. The latest killing of Oromo believers in Arsi is the most provocative and appalling.
Ironically, this regime boasts of realizing equality of faith recognizing the rights of religious groups like Muslims who were mistreated under the previous regimes. It stipulates in its nominal constitution Article 11 “Government shall not interfere in the conduct or practice of any religion. Religion shall not interfere in the affairs of government.” However, because of its preoccupation with the ‘divide and rule’ principle, it could not implement this. It is heavily engaged in interfering in religious affairs instigating conflict, not only between different religions, but also within a given religious group as well.
It is to be recalled that this irresponsible regime has instigated conflict between the followers of Islam and that of Christianity causing heavy loss in life and property at different times. It has created animosity between different sects and churches of Christianity to create conducive condition for its intervention at will. It singles out churches of Oromo majority as OLF church and harasses the members creating confrontation with other churches. Followers of Waaqeffannaa, traditional Oromo religion, are good targets to label as OLF and denied the right to freely follow a religion of their choice. All these indicate that this regime is preoccupied with creating and sustaining division and conflict in the people it purportedly rules, to prolong its cling to power.
OLF, as a liberation organization that upholds the equality of all the religions, does not condone interference in the religious right of any group. The demand of any ethnic or religious group, including the current demand of Muslims, in Ethiopia for its group right is part of overall human rights. Therefore, the OLF condemns the TPLF/EPRDF regime’s violent suppression of peaceful demonstration against its interference in and manipulation of the Muslim community affairs with the strongest terms.
No religion should be used to advance a political end nor should any religion use politics as a tool for its purpose. Therefore, the OLF calls upon the regime to desist from escalating the peaceful demonstration into a wrong direction by killing the demonstrators and instead stop its strategy of cowing the religious community into submitting to its orders. We want to assure that the regime will solely be responsible for whatever dangerous consequence of this reckless policy resorting to guns to suppress peaceful and legitimate demonstration.
Victory to the Oromo People!
Oromo Liberation Front
April 28, 2012
P.O.Box 6973 Asmara, Eritrea Tel 2911 153848 Email: abamilki@gemel.com.er www.OromoLiberationFront.org
Unity of Purpose to Empower Oromian David Against Abyssinian Goliath
As I tried to describe in my last opinion, the Oromo nation (our David) is still in a liberation struggle against the Abyssinian colonizers (the Goliath), who are supported by their powerful handlers from both power players of the Eastern and the Western world. This fighting for freedom from the proxy colonial forces (from the Abyssinian ruling elites) is continuing in multiple forms: diplomatically, militarilly and politically. In this globe, where politcs gives more value to the priciple of the survival of the fittest for only 'might is right', there is no other alternative to empowering the Oromo people, if we are really serious to get bilisummaa/freedom from the oppressors and achieve national walabummaa/sovereignty to determine our destiny. One of the ways to strengthen our David is by forging the necessary unity of purpose between all Oromian liberation forces. What is this unity of purpose, how can we define it operationally?
James Wilson once defined unity of purpose as the blending of primary and derivative responsibilities into a common pursuit. Alexander Hamilton said that securing such unity of purpose, coupled with the desire to make a difference, would generate the necessary energy to assure every nation's liberty and stability. In effect, Wilson's unity of purpose represents a central component of the American constitutional form. In the process of showing the importance of unity of purpose, he asserts that humanity is driven forward by the tension between those who upon viewing order create disorder and those who upon viewing disorder create order. In a conflict between these two diametrically opposite forces, unity of purpose can help those who want to create order/unity to have an essential victory over those who do the opposite. To indicate the very importance of such unity, the current president of the UNO also once told to the African leaders in certain AU leaders' submit: "through unity of purpose, I believe there is no limit to what we can achieve."
From these important sentences said by the above prominent personalities, we can see how relevant is the national or supra-national unity of purpose. Oromo nationalists, who are conscious about the importance of such unity, already started to describe this unity of purpose as 'tokkummaa for bilisummaa' = unity for freedom. The main thing, which the Oromo freedom fighters now desperately need to be successful is such a unity of purpose. We know that unity comes before victory even in a dictionary. That means, we need to have the necessary blending of primary and derivative responsibilities of our freedom fighters into a common pursuit of bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. This blending into a common persuit through such unity of purpose, coupled with the desire to make a difference, would generate the necessary energy to assure the stability and strength of the Oromo liberation bloc. The strength of the Oromo liberation movement (our David) is up to now challenged by the principle put well by Wilson that 'humanity is driven forward by the tension between those who upon viewing order create disorder and those who upon viewing disorder create order'.
These two forces do present also in the Oromo liberation struggle. There are Oromo nationalists who do their best in 'creating order/unity upon viewing disorder/disunity' and we do observe forces from the enemy camp trying to creat disorder upon viewing order in the Oromo liberation camp. The aims of the two opposing movements are of course antagonisitc because of the fact that those who strive to creat order upon viewing disorder in the Oromo liberation camp do try to strengthen the Oromo freedom fighters, whereas those who attempt to create disorder upon viewing order want to weaken the struggle. If these two forces can be differentiated well at least by the Oromo polity, then Oromo nationalists can consciously work on supporting the forces of tokkummaa for bilisummaa in order to empower the Oromian liberation camp (our David) against the Abyssinian colonization/domination camp (the Goliath), i.e against the giant evil, which could develop to be such a big oppressor because of the massive support it gets from those who formed and are keeping the Ethiopian empire as an instrument designed to serve their own interest in the Horn region.
The main two forces we do now see struggling in Oromia and/or Ethiopia in such sense of creating disunity or unity are the Abyssinian forces, who do everything under the sun to weaken Oromo's power by using the divide-and-destroy method and the Oromian forces, who try to fix this problem of discord in the Oromo liberation movement with the purpose of strengthening the Oromo people. No question that to be liberated, the Oromo nation must be a force/humna. For this potentially great nation to be humna, it is fact that tokkummaa of the Oromo líberation forces is necessary. The tokkummaa we need should not necessarily be structural unity so that all liberation forces be in one stronger organization, as we used to dream and wish, but surely the unity of purpose among all the Oromo liberation organizations is mandatroy and a must. The main principle used by the Abyssinian camp to hinder the Oromo nation from being humna is as mentioned above by sowing a discord and using the colonial method of divide-to-destroy.
To that effect particularily the Woyane cadres do apply the so called 'AME principle': the acronym standing for antagonize-moralize-emotionalize. Nowadays, they do try to antagonize the two goals envisioned by the OLF, even though we know that one of the goals will prevail based on the future decision of the Oromo public per referendum on ‘Oromian autonomy with in Ethiopian union' vs 'Oromian independence within African union’. Furthermore both kaayyoo’s are not antagonisitc to each other for the fact that the first kaayyoo is a very good prelude to the second. The cadres go on and try to molarize (paint as if Oromian autonomy is bad like a devil and Oromian independence is good like a divinity or vice versa). After moralizing the two goals like this, they further try to emotionalize (try to manipulate the Oromo nationals, so that we do develop an immense hatred against an Oromian autonomy and of course have an enthusiastic love towards Oromian independence or the reverse).
Regarding such move of the Woyane cadres to create disorder upon viewing order, the main areas of operation observed in the last 20 years of their rule are: the Amhara-Oromo divide, where they do try to make sure that these two camps never find a common denominator and forge a sort of alliance against their regime; the Amhara-Amhara conflict, where they try to hinder the aandinnet/unity of the Amhara camp, which can challenge their power in Finfinne palace; and the Oromo-Oromo discord, where they try to do everything under the sun to avoid any sort of tokkummaa in the Oromo liberation camp, which not only can take over power in Finfinne, but also liberate the whole Oromia from the Abyssinian domination forces. Oromo nationalists in particular and all the anti-Woyane forces in general should try to neutralize this malicious action of the Woyane by promoting the Oromo-Oromo tokkummaa, by not opposing the Amhara-Amhara aandinnet and by being open for the possible Amhara-Oromo tibibbir/alliance/tumsa. It is clear that the forces who want to create disorder upon viewing order are doing their job in the Oromo liberation camp contineously and untiredly. But why do the forces of order/tokkummaa/unity not have such diligence and try their best to deal with these destructive forces of disorder?
To illustrate, the importance of the unity of purpose among the Oromo liberation fronts, let me use the following metaphor by applying the five colors used in the faajjii's/flags of Abbaa-Gadaa and OLF to represent the possible five steps needed to move from the state of suffering under colony towards the future optimal bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. To move from the colonial "Ethiopian unity" of the Abyssinian elites to the free Oromian union envisioned by the Oromo nationalists, these five steps can be undertaken one after the other. Just to categorize some Organizations and to give them political color, we need to divide the karaa/xurree bilisummaa (the roadmap of the Oromo liberation movement) in to five blocs and we can just imagine this roadmap from garbummaa/colony to bilisummaa is marked by the five colors of our two faajjii's:
- the first bloc of the roadmap is colored with white, symbolically the phase of the Ginbot-7's unitary Ethíopia devoid of Oromia, which is obsolete and belongs to the past. We have already travelled this part of the roadmap till 1991.
- the second part is colored with yellow, which represents the status quo, the present Woyane's evil and temporary pseudo-federalism, where in reality Oromia is under occupation of the Woyane forces.
- the third part is the short-term goal of the Oromo liberation movement in the form of genuine killil-federation (true Oromian autonomy) planned by the OLF operating (for example) in Group-7 and this bloc can be painted with the green color.
- the fourth part of the roadmap can be given the red color and it is the middle-term goal of the Oromo liberation movement; i.e an Oromian independence, which is indispensable, must and envisioned by the OLF operating in (for instance) the ULFO.
- the final and fifth part is represented by black color which symbolizes Oromian union (supra-national union of independent nations in the Horn region) as a long-term goal, which is necessary to unite all Oromo in the Horn from Meroe to Mombaasa. As far as I know, the OLF has not yet explicitly stress this final move as a goal.
Whereas we have certain Oromo organizations claiming to be exclusively green and red, none of the structurally existing Oromo liberation forces seems to be exclusively and explicitly black, even though all do have the potential to be; here black being the final and lasting goal which can serve the interest of all the stakeholders in the Horn region. This stepwise move is like the liberation journey from garbummaa under the Amhara rule till 1991 in symbolical Djibouti (white) and from the border town of Ayisha (yellow) representing the status quo under Woyane ----- through Oromian autonomy symbolized by Diredhawa (green) ----- and through Oromian independence represented by a move to Adama (red) ----- to the final goal in the form of Oromian union, which is given the symbol of arriving at Finfinne (black). This liberation journey first towards Diredhawa, then to Adama and at the end to Finfinne is the optimal and progressive move, in which all Oromo freedom fighters can take part. All of them can wear together yellow uniform for the sake of hindering any possible backward and regressive move to Djibouti, the move for which the Amhara forces do struggle. Then, all of them can have green uniform to move together to Diredhawa followed by changing the uniform to red in order to push further towards Adama, and finally all nationalists can together put on black uniform to move to Finfinne, the most beneficial type of Oromian sovereignty.
Now we can clearly see how wrongly we usually do categorize both the Ginbot-7 and the Group-7 in one camp. In reallity, Ginbot-7 wants us to move from the status quo regressively backwards to the white area, whereas the Group-7 tries to help us progressively move from the yellow position forwards to the green zone. Actually Oromo nationalists in the exclusively red uniform could move with the Group-7, who are now wearing green, forwards to the next bloc of the roadmap and then challenge the convincingly green nationals, not to hinder the further move of the Oromo nation to the red zone. At the end, if it will be in the interst of the Oromo people, nothing can inhibit us from the final move to the black part of the roadmap. Here, very important in fostering the imperative unity of purpose among the Oromo liberation organizations is to be conscious that a genuine and true 'Oromian autonomy within Ethiopian union' is a best prelude for an 'Oromian independence within African union'. Thus, through resisting both the white and the yellow Abyssinain force and being open to support the move of the OLF towards both the green and the red blocs, we can harmoneously struggle together.
That is why I do think that the currently ongoing way of alienating the Group-7, which is actually the frank attempt of the OLF to exclusively move to the green zone, from the other Oromo freedom fighters serves only the evil intention of those who want to weaken the unity of purpose in the Oromo liberation camp. Of course, undisputably clear is that to minimize such opposition of some Oromo nationalists against the move of the Group-7, actually also its partner, the Ginbot-7, should have changed its program in a process of forging the alliance between these two respective Amhara and Oromo forces. Otherwise, to understand why we should in unison supprt the progressive moves to both the green and the red zones, we can see that even alaabaa of the OLF is a combination of green (pro-autonomy move) and red (pro-independence move) illustrating the fact that the OLF is by nature inclusive of the two goals, on which the Oromo public will have a referendum at the right time in the future.
Furthermore, important to know regarding the Oromo national liberation movement is the siginificance of allowing our mind-set of bilisummaa (the OLF) to move in all directions and areas by using different factions and rhetorics as mere instruments. The move of this mind-set in a structural (organizational) form of OPDO, OFC, OLF-JJ (Group-7), OLF-QC, OLF-SG and ULFO must be recognized, accepted and respected by all the reasonable and seasoned Oromo nationalists with sound mind. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the different approaches of the OLF operating in these structural Oromo liberation forces, as our foes want to see it and want to make us believe. The move of the OLF, be it tactical or strategical, using these different names is not as such contradictory, but complementary. These different structural organizations of the OLF, who ought to to have the imperative unity of purpose, is necessary for the Oromo nation to come to the kaayyoo (purpose) of bilisummaa Oromo and walabummaa Oromia. Beside the unity of purpose, some other factors, which are necessary to empower Oromian David against Abyssinian Goliath are: our commitment and dedication to sacrifice our talent, money and time for the kaayyoo; our efforts to strengthen the military wing of our movement, the OLA (Oromo Liberation Army) as the only means for the Oromo nation to get respect in the world, where survival of the fittest is the rule of the game; our possiblly smart dipilomacy to get more international support for the Oromian David against the Abyssinian Goliath; and our internal strenghth not to be influenced by the pressure from the enemy camp.
Last but not least, it is not only the use of unity of purpose to empower the Oromian David what is necessary, but also knowing the vice versa, i.e empowering Oromian David can lead us to the consolidation of the necessary tokkummaa for bilisummaa. That means, another way of uniting the Oromo liberation camp is just helping one of the OLF structural organizations be stronger, so that the forces in the weaker structures will be attracted towards the stronger one and this stronger OLF structure can be the core of empowering our David. So let us all Oromo nationals be ready to join one structural liberation organization, which we think can fit our belief and then let's contribute our best to the Oromo's unity of purpose through strengthening where possible the structural unity of the OLF, if not the spiritual uinty of purpose between the existing multiple structures. In this way, we can at least materalize the spiritual unity of all Oromo nationalists with the mind-set of bilisummaa, which we can take as unity of purpose. Such unity of purpoe is indispensable, if we want that at the end of the day Oromian David have victory on the Abyssinian Goliath. Only when we do create such unity of purpose, the Oromo people can boldy assert like the UNO president did: through unity of purpose, there is no limit to what we can achieve. May Rabbi/Waaqa help Oromian David be empowered through our unity of purpose (through tokkummaa for bilisummaa) and help us come out victorious over the Abyssinain Goliath.
Seife Nebelbal is a multimedia news channel which brings to you uncensored and unbiased first hand information from around the globe focusing on Oromo and Oromia. This media company was established in 1993 when the free press was sprouted once and shattered hurriedly in the Ethiopian Empire.
Ethiopia’s Oromo diaspora uses Web to dissent, debate in absence of press freedom By Emily Wax
There may be at least four different factions with varying viewpoints on whether the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, should pursue the birth of an independent country or reform the existing Ethiopian state.
Abebe Belew, host of a popular radio show for Ethiopians. (Washington Post - Nikki Kahn ) But one thing is clear: social media and the Internet have become a powerful tool for debate among the Oromo diaspora, which stretches from Minnesota to Washington D.C. to the Netherlands. Online, the diaspora discusses issues that range from the persecution of the Oromo back in Ethiopia to the infighting among Oromo political factions outside the country. The Oromo number as many as 40 million, according to some estimates.
The Web site conversation comes at a time when the Ethiopian government has been accused of cracking down on and jailing both Oromo leaders and people from its domestic media. Ethiopia is “the second-leading jailer of journalists in Africa,” only after its arch-foe Eritrea, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. It has one of the largest numbers of exiled journalists in the world, the committee says.
The Ethiopian government has denied accusations that it is autocratic or repressive of the media.
“There’s no press freedom in Ethiopia and Oromo voices are particularly not tolerated,” Mohammed Ademo, a Columbia University journalism graduate student and co-founder and editor of OPride, a Web site that upholds Oromo identity and culture, said in an e-mail. OPride is not affiliated with any political faction.
“Despite the huge size of the Oromo population, there is no single independent Oromo newspaper, radio, Web site, or TV in Ethiopia. OPride... is our meager attempt to fill the gap is being blocked. We use social media to engage with our readers and spur discussions about the future direction of the country.”
Gadaa is another an independent online media outlet serving the Horn of African region and its diaspora.
Ademo said Oromos, whose demands are as diverse as the community itself, are very passionate about ending their marginalization in Ethiopia and equally indignant about the factionalism among diaspora-based groups. They see it as a great disservice to their struggle.
After a Washington Post story appeared on one faction of the Oromo Liberation Front, many readers wrote me e-mails and posted their feelings on Web sites that focus on the Oromo diaspora.
Fido Ebba, head of foreign relations for one of the major factions of the Oromo Liberation Front, said that his organization continues to lead armed and political struggle in many Oromo areas in Ethiopia, to protest human rights violations of Oromos by the government.
He said that Web sites and radio stations work to unite Oromo by giving them a safe forum to voice their views, at a time when the Ethiopian government is cracking down on dissent.
“Many Oromos in diaspora are well engaged with cyberspace including Facebook and Twitter, to follow developments in the struggle of their own people,” said Ebba. “This has enabled many Oromos in diaspora to actively participate in the liberation struggle of their people.”
Taha Tuko, a member of the executive committee of another breakaway faction of the Oromo Liberation Front that I wrote about earlier this week, said will now focus on uniting with other opposition parties. Together, Tuko said, the parties will fight against Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to form “a new Ethiopia where all Ethiopia including Oromos can benefit, politically, economically and socially.”
He and others accuse the prime minister of being autocratic, corrupt and repressive of the media.
His group has been holding public meetings, which have been written about online, in 11 cities around the world including Washington, Houston, Oslo and Frankfurt.
“We will fight Meles by all means of struggle to get rid of the regime,” Tuko said, adding that his group would use violence if needed. “Because the government is violent against Oromos.”
The Ethiopian town that's home to the world's greatest runners
What do Kenenisa Bekele, Tirunesh Dibaba, Derartu Tulu and Fatuma Roba have in common, apart from being Olympic gold medal-winning runners? They all come from Bekoji in Ethiopia – and they were all trained by one man
Simon Hattenstone guardian.co.uk, Friday 6 April 2012
Runners at the stadium in Bekoji, starting their daily training session with Sentayehu Eshetu, known simply as Coach. Photograph: Ben Quinton for the Guardian
Outside the blue hut is a plaque with a beautifully calligraphed set of rules and regulations – athletes must train hard, respect each other, work as a team and honour their homeland. At the top of the plaque three flags have pride of place: Ethiopia, the local region of Oromia and the Olympics. This is the office of Sentayehu Eshetu, known to everybody as Coach. To be honest, it's more run-down garden shed than office. Inside, it is dark and dusty, but the late afternoon sun lights up a series of photographs of athletes on the wall. All have won at least one gold medal at middle- or long-distance running. Amazingly, six of the champions originate from this tiny town of Bekoji, and have been coached by Coach.
If Sentayehu Eshetu is not the world's greatest coach, he is surely the greatest discoverer of running talent. In London this summer, two of the 54-year-old's most successful former prodigies, Kenenisa Bekele and Tirunesh Dibaba, will defend Olympic golds at 5,000m and 10,000m. Then there's his first champion, Derartu Tulu, who won the Olympic 10,000m in Barcelona in 1992 and eight years later in Sydney, and Fatuma Roba, who won the Olympic marathon in 1996 in Atlanta; and the latest generation of champions – Tirunesh's sister Genzebe, only 21 and already world indoor champion at 1500m, and Kenenisa's younger brother Tariku who won the 3000m gold at the World Indoor Championships.
Coach is a small man with a big smile. He talks quietly and is not one for hyperbole. When I suggest he has a magical touch, he looks alarmed. "No! No magic," he says intensely. "I don't do any magic. It's the weather and the fact that everything is helping them." He must have something special? "They listen well and work hard. And eat well. You know barley? They eat barley." He grins and says I should eat more barley.
Bekoji is 170 miles south of the capital, Addis Ababa. There are plenty of donkeys and horses and goats and cows on the road, but few cars. Coach says around 17,000 people live in the town of Bekoji; there are 25 car owners and he knows all of them. The landscape looks arid but is incredibly fertile. Everything grows here – oil seeds, coffee, tea, spices, sugar cane, cotton, cereals. The centre of Bekoji sits 10,500 feet above sea level and has an average temperature of 66 degrees. Its inhabitants are proud of its climate and special air. On arriving, I find it hard to breathe, but when I do manage to gulp some in, I quickly realise how crisp and pure it is. If you can run here, they say, you can run anywhere.
We head off across the red ochre soil, which blows up yet another mini dust storm, past the corrugated shacks and rubble and randomly parked lorries, and head for Bekoji stadium. It's not as grand as it sounds. There is one primitive stand, a grassy bank for people to sit on and a straggly football pitch in the middle. This is where Coach takes his youngsters, between the ages of 12 and 20, through their paces five times a week.
There must be more to your success than feeding the runners barley, I say to Coach. "I give full attention to my team and I'm always on time, and I will do anything it takes to make them a champion. I tell them what they should do, and if they follow that, they run very well." Coach never ran himself. His sport was football. He taught PE and played in central defence. These days he hobbles more than runs. He shows me the knackered knee that did for his football ambitions.
Until now, the rest of the world has remained oblivious to Coach's achievements, but for the past four years a documentary film crew has recorded in Bekoji and has produced a lovely film called Town Of Runners. It's no exaggeration – any day at sunrise you will see groups of teenagers or adults running up the hill. Most will be on their way to the two-hour daily training session with Coach. Within an hour the sky goes from red to white to perfect blue. By 8am, the sun is burning through in the 80s.
Coach is thinking about why so many great runners come from here – determination, physical strength from working the land, huge lungs, role models, perfect body shape. (Many of the most successful distance runners have been small, light and immensely strong, with a superhuman capacity to endure – the biopic of Ethiopia's most famous runner, Haile Gebrselassie, who comes from down the road in Asella, is called Endurance.) Running is a means of escape and transcendence in Ethiopia – Coach's best runners will go to "finishing school" in Addis Ababa and that is just the start of their journey. Every day, Coach says, parents will ask him to train their children. "Kids want to run to make their parents happy, and the parents want them to run so they don't have to work the land. They say, come and take my son or daughter."
It must be heartbreaking telling them that they are not going to make it, I say. He shakes his head. If they have any natural ability, he insists, you can never write them off. Athletes come through unexpectedly – and fail unexpectedly. He tells me about Zegeue Shifarawu Abebe, the young man who takes training with him. "He used to train with Kenenisa, and we thought he was the better runner; that he was the one who was going to win Olympic medals." For whatever reason, Zegeue never made it, and now he's out every morning coaching tomorrow's champions.
At the Bekoji stadium, the kids are gathering on the grass banks. It's 7am, but no one's yawning – perhaps its something in the air. Alemi Tsegaye is one of the girls featured in Town Of Runners. She and her friend Hawii Megersa were two of the most promising local athletes when the film-makers started shooting. But they may not be quite good enough. In the early days, Hawii tended to win the races and Alemi would finish runner-up. She said it made her just as happy to finish second to Hawii as if she had won. In the film, we see both girls graduate to "running camp" – they leave home for a promised land of concentrated training, healthy food, a small wage and school. But it didn't work out that way. The camps, or clubs, were well intentioned but badly run by regional government, and the girls felt neglected; Alemi returned home disappointed and Hawii returned distraught, suffering what appeared to be a breakdown.
Since then, Hawii has gone off to another camp where she is said to be happier, and Alemi is between camps. Today, back at training and now 18, she is glad to be with her friends.
Like many Ethiopians, Alemi is reserved. I ask questions through a translator and she stares straight ahead when answering, nodding her head from side to side, avoiding eye contact. "I wanted to go to school, but it is very far from the camp. They keep promising we can go to school, but there's not enough money and it never happens."
There was another problem at camp – the food. All they were fed was injera, the Ethiopian yeast-risen bread that is rich in iron but tends to bloat the stomach. "Injera, injera, injera," she says. "Not enough milk and honey."
We talk about the freakishly high number of great runners from Bekoji. She mentions the special air, of course, and points to the landscape. "We can run on the flat and in the hills. So we can train for all conditions." Then she points to Coach, looks at me for the first time and smiles. "Good coach." What makes him so special? "He's like a parent. You can ask him anything."
Why does she want to become a champion? "For my country and for my family." It's the answer they all give. "If I can't make a living as a runner, I want to be doctor." Is that realistic? Well, she says, her family farm wheat and maize, and are relatively wealthy for this area, so yes. "It was possible, but I've fallen behind in my learning. Most of the children who go to the running camps fall behind."
Later that day I meet Frehiwot Sisay, a friend of Alemi's who was at camp with her. She tells me how awful it was there. "Out of 55 of us, 53 left." Runners leave for a variety of reasons – they are not good enough to make the required times, they are unhappy or homesick. "They fed us for only three days. The other four days we had to provide for ourselves. We had to sleep on the floor. The two girls who were left weren't even good runners. They were in their late 20s, too old to go home."
Coach blows his whistle to start training. All 200 run round the 400m track. It's easy – barely a trot. Then Coach whistles and they speed up. Within seconds they are half a track away from me – their strides massive, elegant, easy. One time round the track and my chest tightens, my lungs burn, my head hurts and I feel sick. The special air, no doubt.
Coach takes us through our paces for the next two hours. The emphasis is on stretching and loosening, and he refers to the routines as gymnastics. There are so many different exercises – running on the front of your toes, on the back of your heels, bending low and scattering imaginary crops, skipping with an invisible rope, duck-walking, goose-stepping, horse-cantering. "Up, up, up," Coach says, as the athletes lift their legs ever higher. In the distance cocks crow and dogs howl, but otherwise the silence in the Great Rift Valley is overwhelming. Occasionally it's broken by "Up, up, up up" and the drum of feet beating the soil in perfect time.
It's beautiful here – red soil, blue sky, green savannah, mountains in the distance and the smell of eucalyptus everywhere. "It's the best," Biruk Fikadu says. Both his parents died in their 30s and he has lived with his grandmother ever since. "It is very beautiful here, but it is also boring. It is a happy place, but there is no money. You have to go to Addis to make money."
Before long the going gets too tough for me and I drop out. I'm not the only one who's exhausted. Coach tells me that after training most of the children fall asleep in the afternoon and miss school. Few runners manage to combine training and education. As a former teacher, Coach has mixed feelings about this – yes, of course, he'd rather they studied, especially now that all children can go to government-funded local schools, but if running is their passion, it's pointless trying to deny them.
Ephren Dejenne, 17, has been training with Coach for three years. He is running 400m and 800m, and hopes to work his way up to 1500m. He's not yet graduated to club level, but Coach says Ephren is one of his most promising runners. He has a tattoo on his upper arm, drawn in pen. "It says 'I am' – it is a statement about me, about believing in myself."
His trainers are falling apart, but he says there is plenty of life left in them. He will sew and resew them, and when the sole goes, he will buy a newer sole and glue it on. Like most of the youngsters here, he will have saved up for between six months and a year for his pair of secondhand trainers. But these are far from the poorest people in Bekoji. To own any kind of trainers, you are likely to belong to the middle class – owning a few dozen cows or goats. Ephren's father is a chauffeur and his mother has a butter business. Like everybody here today, he says he will succeed and go on to run in the Olympics. "If I win, I will buy a house for my mum."
Some of the locals live in very nice houses – three or four rooms, made of bricks, lots of land – but many still live in one-room shacks made from mud. Next door to the newish Hotel Wabe where I am staying for £7 a night is a row of run-down shacks. In one, three children live in one dark room with a sleepy cow and a goat. The shacks are government-owned and cost around 12 birr a week to rent – just under 50p. Farther along the road, a woman is cooking injera on a fire. The only possession the family seems to have is a TV and a huge satellite dish that dominates the backyard.
Back at the hotel, an official from the regional tourist board stops to chat. Sinkeneh Tilahun says he can't stand the way Ethiopia is perceived by the rest of the world. "What is Ethiopia labelled?" he demands. "We're labelled famine country. Greece is a country dependent on aid, but would you call it a dependent country? Yes, we still have drought sometimes, but this is a land of plenty. Now the area is completely developed, and lots of it's been done without aid – like the massive dam on the Nile." He has a point. Over the past three years a road linking Bekoji to Addis has been built by the Chinese. But the fact remains that, for all Ethiopia's wealth, 39% of the population lives below the international poverty line of $1.25 a day, and in 2011 the country ranked 174 of 187 countries in the Human Development Index.
Sinkeneh thinks Ethiopia has produced such great distance runners because kids here always had to run to get to school. "I was lucky I only had to run half an hour a day. Gebrselassie had to run six miles to school. Maybe our runners won't be so good now they don't have to run great distances to school."
After training the next day, we head off in a Land Rover to see Derartu Tulu's house, at the end of a long mud track. Derartu now owns a hotel in Asella and lives in Addis, but she often returns to Bekoji and has provided well for her family. Her mother, an orthodox Christian (the second religion in Bekoji is Islam), has gone to church to fast for three days. A woman stands outside the gates and says we cannot enter. She has a severe, handsome face and holds herself with immense dignity. It turns out she is Tejetu, Derartu's aunt. She soon relents and lets us in. "Derartu used to practise on the field here every day. She used to help her mum and do training every day. She cooked and cleaned. When she was five or six we knew she was unusual." In what way? "She was a very strong, powerful girl."
Tejetu is joined by an older woman who balances herself on a stick and has an expressive singsong voice. Habersha is Derartu's stepmother (her father's first wife) and helped bring her up. "Her mother was not happy she was running, but she helped her all the same," Habersha says. "She was afraid she might go away and she'd lose her. She didn't want her to leave home."
Did they have any idea she'd become an Olympic champion? "No, we never knew," Habersha says. "The first time she ran a race, she was given a dress for winning and she hid it so her mum wouldn't know. She showed it to me. The second time she ran, she brought home a glass trophy. She showed that to her mum, and her parents allowed her to run after that."
Did they watch her winning her first Olympic gold? "No, we listened on the radio. About 60-70 people came round. We were dancing. Her father was alive at the time. We were all so happy."
After the Olympics, Derartu went on to win a great deal of prize money (in 2009, aged 37, she won the New York marathon in her comeback race – a prize of $130,000) and was given land by the Ethiopian government for which she bought more cattle. Tejetu says with 50 cows they were never a poor family, but Derartu's success has made a big difference to their life. "She came back and built this house here. We got a television, and she bought more animals. She supported everyone, giving clothes and money to family and neighbours. Everyone."
Did people treat them differently after Derartu won? "If the neighbours have problems, they ask, and Derartu will help. Even if they don't ask, she can see and will help. That's how she is."
On the way back, Coach tells me Derartu has always been his favourite champion. "Everybody loves her. She is sociable." Do the successful runners keep in touch with him when they leave for Addis? "Some do. Some come back and say thank you after they have won the Olympics, some don't. Derartu and Kenenisa and Tirunesh all said thank you, the others didn't." Does it bother him? "No. The reward is seeing them win."
We're on the road to Addis to see Haile Gebrselassie's empire. He's considered by many the greatest ever distance runner, and he's already on the way to becoming Ethiopia's greatest tycoon. He's 38 and it's only four years since he won the Berlin marathon in a world record time of two hours three minutes and 59 seconds. At the time he could command $250,000 appearance money just to run in a city marathon. He runs a number of successful businesses, including, in the centre of Addis, a complex dedicated to his wife, Alem: here is the Alem gym, car salesroom, cinema complex. In a multistorey, glass-fronted building, he and Alem also run a holiday resort business.
A lift takes us to the top floor, which looks out over all of Addis. Haile is out working, but Alem welcomes me. She tells me how they got together. She had a shop in Addis, on Haile's running route. She didn't know who he was – just another man who ran past quickly every day. After a year he walked in and asked for her phone number. It took her a while to realise he was asking her out: "He was shy." He thought she was above his station.
Alem is dressed in an elegant trouser suit. She stands on the balcony as we talk, queen of all she surveys. Is Haile one of the wealthiest men in Ethiopia now? "Yes, he is one of them." She giggles, embarrassed. Does he still run? Try stopping him, she says. "He runs everywhere. There is construction work we are doing, and he runs there. Then he runs in the mountains."
They have four children, the oldest 13, the youngest six. Are they runners? She looks shocked. "No! They are students." Would she prefer it if they won Olympic gold or went into business? "For me, I prefer first learning. The same for Haile."
Back in Bekoji, Coach welcomes me to his home. He has saved all his life for this four-room house. It cost the equivalent of £3,000. How could he afford it? He says he can't really, and expects to be paying it off for the rest of his life. He is paid £70 a month before tax by the local government, and struggles to make ends meet. "I have three children, two adopted children and a wife. It is not easy." But he's not complaining. He was born in Harar and grew up in a mud shack – that was real poverty, he says. He talks about all the changes he's seen in his life: he lived for many years under Mengistu Haile Mariam's communist military dictatorship. Although the current government has been condemned for silencing dissenters (in January, Amnesty revealed that at least 107 opposition party members and journalists have been charged under terrorist offences since March 2011), Coach says life today is incomparable.
"Now there are more factories, more schools, more people working. You just had to do what the military told you in the dictatorship." He introduces me to his son, Beck, who wants to be a doctor. Does he run? "No." What went wrong? Coach smiles. "Nothing. He's just concentrating on his studies."
Coach talks about his own plans for the future. In five years he hopes to retire. Maybe then he will train a small group of runners privately. He is looking forward to taking it easy, but he worries that he won't know what to do with his time. I ask if he has received official recognition from the government for his work. "No." He stops, and says that's not quite right. "The local government gave me a gold chain a few years ago."
Has he ever wished he was on a percentage of all the money his champions have earned? "No." He laughs. "What would I do with it?" Surely there's something he's desperate to buy? Actually, there is. "When my marathon runners train, I have no way of seeing how they are doing. What I'd love is a motorbike so I can follow them, but there is no way I could afford one."
The Recent 'Report' on the Washington Post about the OLF Has Nothing to Do with the OLF
OLF Press Release | April 6, 2012
The article by Emily Wax, The Washington Post reporter, under the title "As separatists in Ethiopia disarm, a new chapter for D.C.'s Oromo community" alleging laying down of arms and succumbing to the imposed unity of Ethiopia is inaccurate. Many Oromo nationals who got the chance to read that article have been airing their disapproval of the said report in every possible term.
The erroneous nature of the report emanates not only from the misrepresentation of the OLF goal and objective but also from the list of the people that appear in the report who are not currently in the membership list of the organization. It would not be that hard for a genuine report to be prepared about the OLF since the organization's office is listed in the Washington DC telephone directory with the right numbers and address, and the names of the officers thereof could be obtained from the Department of Justice. We regret that the reporter, probably misled by our opponents, opted to misrepresent our organization in such an embarrassing manner. We are also surprised that, despite our repeated request, the reporter failed to correct this violation of journalistic ethics. This one-sided report in The Washington Post, based on the distortion of the legitimate struggle of the Oromo people by negligible splinter group, has infuriated not only our members but also the Oromo people at large.
Oromia-Ethiopia: OLF Response to Washington Post’s Report
April 7, 2012 at 12:42 am · Gadaa.com
The following is a press release from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Obbo Dawud Ibsaa, responding to claims made by a recent story of The Washington Post. It’s also to be noted that, a few days later, the reporter wrote a follow-up blog acknowledging the voice of the wider Oromo community in exile, but without correcting claims made of the Oromo national liberation movement in the first report.
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The Recent ‘Report’ on the Washington Post about the OLF Has Nothing to Do with the OLF
OLF Press Release
Gadaa.com
The article by Emily Wax, The Washington Post reporter, under the title “As separatists in Ethiopia disarm, a new chapter for D.C.’s Oromo community,” alleging laying down of arms and succumbing to the imposed unity of Ethiopia is inaccurate. Many Oromo nationals, who got the chance to read that article have been airing their disapproval of the said report in every possible term.
The erroneous nature of the report emanates, not only from the misrepresentation of the OLF goal and objective, but also from the list of the people who appear in the report who are not currently in the membership list of the organization. It would not be that hard for a genuine report to be prepared about the OLF since the organization’s office is listed in the Washington DC telephone directory with the right numbers and address, and the names of the officers thereof could be obtained from the Department of Justice. We regret that the reporter, probably misled by our opponents, opted to misrepresent our organization in such an embarrassing manner. We are also surprised that, despite our repeated request, the reporter failed to correct this violation of journalistic ethics. This one-sided report in The Washington Post, based on the distortion of the legitimate struggle of the Oromo people by a negligible splinter group, has infuriated not only our members, but also the Oromo people at large.
Contrary to the inaccurate report in The Washington Post, the OLF wants to make it clear to our members, supporters, the Oromo people at large, our friends and the international community that we have never revised our programme, which is the realization of the right of the Oromo people to independence, nor did we renounce the right to resort to armed struggle as long as the conditions that initially forced us to pick up the arms persists.
Our people identify very well those opportunists who, for the sake of their personal benefits, ally with our strategic adversaries and campaign against the national interest. Their effort to compensate for the total rejection they faced from the Oromo people by resorting to foreign media to be heard reveals the level of their desperation. It is a recent memory of the Oromo people that they have previously resorted to such tactics when they used the Oromo Liberation Army in the Southern Oromia Zone to appear on a foreign media, but later facilitated its surrender to the enemy. Again the imperial Ethiopianist forces with few renegades, who defected to them, are trying to use their connection in Washington DC to misuse The Washington Post to undermine the genuine OLF and declare the presence of this caricature despite the rejection by the Oromo people.
It has to be clear that under no circumstance will the desperate effort of all shades of the enemy of the Oromo people will push the struggle to falter. Time will come when The Washington Post will review such a damaging report on the legitimate struggle of the Oromo people.
Victory to the Oromo People! April 6, 2012
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) P.O.Box 6973 Asmara, Eritrea Tel 2911 153848 Email: abamilki@gemel.com.er OromoLiberationFront.org Press Release in More Languages:
"Under the terms of the 1995 constitution, the government has created nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally administered city-states. The result is an asymmetrical federation that combines populous regional states such as Oromiya and Amhara in the central highlands with sparsely populated and underdeveloped ones including Gambella and Somalia. However, ethnic federalism has failed to resolve the “national question.” The EPRDF’s ethnic policy has empowered some groups, but has not been accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. For Amhara and national elites, ethnic federalism impedes progress toward a strong and unitary nation-state. For ethno-national rebel groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF, made up of Somalis in the Ogaden) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), ethnic federalism remains artificial. While the concept has failed to accommodate grievances, it has powerfully promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups."
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2011. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $2 a day.
Ethiopia’s political performance in 2009 and 2010 was characterized by contradiction within the government’s politics: While the government under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi successfully launched economic reforms aimed at stimulating economic growth and economic diversification, it brought the country’s democratization process nearly to a halt. The bitter results of the 2005 and 2010 elections, indirectly manipulated by the government, and the subsequent authoritarian backlash have frustrated nearly all relevant political actors outside the government camp. Opposition parties have been undermined to the extent that they no longer pose a threat; the media and civil society have been leashed by oppressive laws; and trade unions and professional associations have been forced either to toe the line or, like the Teacher’s Union, be dissolved.
The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of five political parties under the leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), is expected to remain firmly in control at all levels of government following its emphatic “victory” in the May 2010 parliamentary election, which did not receive the label “free and fair” from the EU Electoral Observation Mission. The EPRDF and its allied parties gained a 99% majority in Ethiopia’s parliament, the House of People’s Representatives, with opposition candidates winning just two seats. The EPRDF won 499 out of 544 seats and the Somali People’s Democratic Party 24 seats, while the three opposition parties together won only two seats, down from 161 five years before. It is widely believed that the scale of the victory resulted from harassment of political opponents and the memory of the violent crackdown on post-election violence in 2005, as well as the passage of restrictive laws governing the media, civil society and political funding.
What happened in Ethiopia after 2005 comes close to a process of politically engineered democratic regression: Although the constitution of 1995 was applauded for its commitment to liberal democracy and respect for political freedoms and human rights, the EPRDF regime refused to accept democratic rules of the game as a part of its political practice. While promising democracy, the government has not accepted that the legal opposition is qualified to take power via the ballot box. It tends to regard the expression of different views and interests as a form of betrayal. When the EPRDF felt threatened by the opposition’s unexpected victory winning all council seats in the capital in 2005, its brutal crackdown against the opposition demonstrated the extent to which the regime is willing to ignore popular protest and foreign criticism in the interest of holding to power.
The government’s behavior in the aftermath of the May 2005 elections raised fundamental questions about the legitimacy of its rule. The human and political rights situation has worsened significantly since the balloting was held. An official parliamentary report on post-election violence in 2006 documented 30,000 arrests, 199 deaths resulting in most cases from gunfire, and the use of “excessive force” on the part of the government.
The international community has widely ignored or downplayed these political problems. Some donors appear to consider food security more important than democracy in Ethiopia, but they neglect the increased ethnic awareness and tensions created by the regionalization policy and the potentially explosive consequences.
Instability in the volatile Horn of Africa has tended to cement Ethiopia’s position as the United States’ key ally in the region, while strained relations with Eritrea and the failing Somali state will continue to dominate the foreign policy agenda. The protracted border dispute with Eritrea remains at a dangerous impasse.
In 2009, Ethiopia withdrew all of its military forces from Somalia after two years seeking to assist Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in its struggle against Islamist rebels, the Islamic Courts Union. On the Eritrea-Ethiopian border issue, the ideological and judicial stalemate continued: No talks were held and the U.N Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) withdrew its cooperation.
On the level of socioeconomic development, the country has taken steps toward market-based reforms, such as trade regulation and an “agricultural development-led industrialization.” In the last five years, GDP growth has attained remarkable rates of 7% to 9% per year. The country remains heavily dependent on the performance of the dominant agricultural sector, with coffee and “chat” as the main cash crops. Economic diversification has been hampered by the reluctance of the government to accept land privatization or allow activity by foreign banks. But the government has recently shown new flexibility toward trade liberalization.
The country still has a huge trade imbalance (imports of $7.21 billion compared to exports of $1.56 for the year 2008), and a current-account deficit of 4% of GDP.
The threat of famine rose again as a serious problem for Ethiopia in 2008 – 2009.
Despite remarkable GDP growth rates (7% – 9% per year), some 5 million to 6 million people were again in need of food aid. Assistance came from the World Bank, IMF (Exogenous Shocks Facility), the European Union, the United States and China. In total, Ethiopia received almost $1.8 billion in development aid and loans in 2009, bringing the total sum received since 1991 to just under $26 billion.
Relations with China strengthened during the period under review, and were dominated by the economic interests and resource acquisitions of China. Trade between the two nations rose substantially again, reportedly reached a value of $1.376 billion. China’s post-Communist, state-capitalist model and its dominant-party governance system continued to appeal to Ethiopian leaders.
History and Characteristics of Transformation
Ethiopia in its present form – with 82 million inhabitants living in a multicultural federal state consisting of nine culturally diverse regions and two city administrations – is the outcome of the expansionist politics pursued by the Amharic-speaking people of the central highlands since the 19th century. Emperor Menelik II (1889 – 1913) conquered several ethnic groups, tribes and fertile regions south of “Abyssinia” (i.e., the highlands in the north, inhabited by Christian Amharic- and Tigray-speaking highlanders), among them the Oromo- and Somali-speaking peoples. A total of 64 ethnic groups are recognized by the state, with the Oromo, with around 20 million people, the most numerous ethnic group. A forceful nation-building process started rather recently, but has to date failed to bridge the socioeconomic gap between north and south. Ethnic clashes and religious tensions continue primarily in the south, continuing a recurrent pattern of conflict over borders, land and water resources between ethno-linguistic groups. In 2009, for example, this conflict led to hundreds of people being killed and tens of thousands displaced. An Oromo Liberation Front (ORF) remains active against the central government, fighting for political secession of “Oromiya.”
The roots of a modern state were laid by Menelik, who repelled an Italian invasion in 1896 in the battle of Adwa, thus sparing his country the experience of colonialism. The process of Ethiopia’s modernization started under Emperor Haile Selassie (1930 – 1974) and continued under the successive regimes of socialist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974 – 1991) and the current multiparty EPRDF government under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a strong authoritarian leader.
Emperor Haile Selassie annexed Eritrea in 1962, triggering the formation of an Eritrean liberation movement that won the struggle against Ethiopia after 30 years of war that proved devastating to both sides. Eritrea gained its independence as a sovereign state through a referendum in 1993. In 1974, the senile Haile Selassie (who had paid little attention to a severe famine in 1971 – 1974, when more than 1 million peasants starved to death) was overthrown by a coup of army officers and later killed. A Provisional Military Administration Council (Derg in Amharaic) under Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam took power, establishing a brutal regime that lasted until 1991.
More than 100,000 people were killed during the Derg period (the so-called red terror), and many more were driven into exile in the United States and Western Europe. Among the victims were many students and intellectuals who were in favor of a modern democratic state. In 1977, the new leadership proclaimed Ethiopia to be a socialist state, nationalizing land and real estate.
When the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, won the war of liberation against the Derg government (Mengistu fled into exile in Zimbabwe), the new government had to cope with a threefold transition: the transition from civil war to a lasting comprehensive peace; a political transition from totalitarian dictatorship to pluralistic multiparty democracy, which was a conditio sine qua non for foreign aid; and finally a transition from a socialist planned economy to a capitalist market economy able to withstand competition within globalized markets. Since that time, some remarkable results with regard to economic recovery and institutional rebuilding have been achieved.
Ethiopia today remains a poor landlocked multiethnic country, which has been dominated for 20 years by a single ethnic minority group, represented by the TPLF. This party has sought remain in power no matter what the cost, increasingly intimidating opponents and harassing opposition politicians. Since the first elections in 1995, the coalition of political parties making up the EPRDF has maintained its monopoly on the use of force across the country. However, some armed resistance against the government still exists in the south and among militant sections of the Oromo and Somali.
Transformation Status
I. Political Transformation
1 | Stateness
Monopoly on the use of force
Ethiopia is a strong and stable state with an authoritarian government under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who has radically transformed the hitherto centralized state into the Federal Democratic Republic. Under the terms of the 1995 constitution, the government has created nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally administered city-states. The result is an asymmetrical federation that combines populous regional states such as Oromiya and Amhara in the central highlands with sparsely populated and underdeveloped ones including Gambella and Somalia. However, ethnic federalism has failed to resolve the “national question.” The EPRDF’s ethnic policy has empowered some groups, but has not been accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. For Amhara and national elites, ethnic federalism impedes progress toward a strong and unitary nation-state. For ethno-national rebel groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF, made up of Somalis in the Ogaden) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), ethnic federalism remains artificial. While the concept has failed to accommodate grievances, it has powerfully promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups.
The main trouble spot remains the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, where the government’s harsh campaign to suppress the ONLF, a violent insurgent movement with a similarly brutal record, has continued. Thousands of residents have fled the area.
During the period under review, there were also sporadic clashes between government forces and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) units in the east and west of the Oromiya region. The OLF is fighting for the independence of the Oromo people, who make up 40% of the country’s population as a whole. But due to a lack of external support and financial and logistic resources, the OLF cannot be regarded as a serious danger to the stability of the country.
State identity
The concept of Ethiopian citizenship is fully accepted by the majority, but questioned by ethnic minorities. At least three ethnic groups – Somalis, Afars and Oromos – do not feel politically loyal to the Ethiopian state ruled by highlanders from the north. Opposition is strongest among the Ogaden people in the Somali region, who feel a greater affinity toward Somalia, and parts of the Oromo people, who provide the Oromo Liberation Front with sufficient support to survive despite its poor organization and lack of progress. As a third ethnic and cultural minority, the Afars also challenge the legitimacy of the federal state.
No interference of religious dogmas
Ethiopia is a secular state, and there are no religious dogmas which might influence the legal order. The majority of federal government figures is either Christian or has a Christian-dominated background, and many therefore believe that a subtle discrimination against Muslims exists. Roughly one-third of the population is Muslim. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government is seriously concerned about the growing influence of fundamentalist Quran schools funded from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. In 2010, Prime Minister Meles ended a disastrous three-year campaign in Somalia aimed at destroying Islamist rebel groups there. The government is seeking the support of the Orthodox Church and other religions as a tool for political control. Religious leaders (orthodox, Muslim, protestants) are often pressured to issue broadcasted statements and messages of support for major EPRDF actions, with the government seeking support of their religious communities.
Basic administration
The country has had a basic modern administrative structure since the times of Emperor Haile Selassie, reaching down to the village level. The Meles government has consolidated this structure with the introduction of regions and city administrations. Each of the country’s nine regions consists of a number of zones, which are in turn comprised of districts (woredas) and local councils (kebeles).
Basic administrative services such as security, magistrate courts, health care and public education are delivered in a top-down manner, and reach most of the country. Administration is in general weaker in the south, but since 2008, several bigger towns have been upgraded to the status of semi-autonomous metropolitan councils. In these regions, more than 40 ethnic minorities often face identity-related problems, and there are internal struggles for more administrative freedom and autonomy. Administration is even weaker in the eastern part of the country, particularly in the Somali region, and at the borders between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. Elected representatives (councils) are supposed to control administrative services at each level. However, authorities have banned journalists from the region, preventing the outside world from accurately assessing the situation there.
2 | Political Participation
Free and fair elections
There have been no free and fair elections in the country since the establishment of the new political regime under the constitution of 1995. Between the parliamentary multiparty elections of 2005 and those of 2010, the situation with regard to political participation has worsened dramatically. During the 2005 elections, the opposition was strongest in Addis Ababa, the capital: The opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party won a landslide victory, winning 137 of the city’s council’s 138 seats; however, only three years later during local and by-elections, the EPRDF won all but one seat at the capital’s district and sub-city administrative level.
Ethiopia is not an “electoral democracy.” The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is staffed with EPRDF members, and is not autonomous. Though the board is supposed to be neutral, it in fact often aggressively attacks opposition parties and clearly demonstrates support for the EPRDF. The board has lost credibility with the majority of voters.
Members of the lower house are selected in popular elections, while upper chamber members are selected by the state legislatures, with members of both houses serving five-year terms. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is expected to remain firmly in power at all levels of government following its emphatic victory in federal and regional elections in May 2010. The ruling party now has a 99% majority in Ethiopia’s House of People’s Representatives, with opposition candidates winning just two seats. The scale of the victory resulted from the memory of the violent crackdown on post-election violence in 2005, along with the passage of restrictive laws governing the media, civil society and political funding.
While the government attributed its success to its policies, analysts believe the elections were heavily manipulated. Voters’ disappointment with the opposition, fear of losing access to government services and jobs, and continual intimidation and harassment are other possible explanations. Ethnic politics and the fear of potential civil war have led many voters to give up hope for a democratic society. Many citizens have lost belief in the democratic process, considering elections to be merely a ritual.
Opposition parties were permitted and have been represented in parliament since the controversial 2005 elections, but serious irregularities during the voting process and ballot count occurred. Candidates from opposition parties were often harassed, beaten up and even killed, with the result that opposition parties decided to boycott the 2010 elections. The opposition also boycotted local elections in 2008, accusing the EPRDF of harassment. Opposition activities were further restricted in 2009, as the EPRDF prepared for the 2010 federal and regional elections. In June 2009, 45 members of an unregistered political party were charged with trying to topple the government.
After the 2010 elections, opposition parties stated that 450 of their members and candidates had been jailed by the government. A major opposition leader, Judge Birturkan Mideqsa of the United Democratic Justice Party (UDJ) remained in prison from 2008 through 2010; she was held in solitary confinement until June of that year, with deleterious consequences for her health. She symbolizes the lack of progress in democratization, fair election campaigns and political trust building.
Effective power to govern
Elected political representatives in parliament and government have considerable power to govern the country, with the exception of the southern districts (Somali region) and the Afar region, in which frustrated minorities challenge the legitimacy of the federal state and the government in the capital Addis Ababa. The political and administrative elites, as well as the leading military officers, are largely from the Tigray region, and believe themselves to have a special mandate to lead the country out of poverty. Political power is organized in such a way that representatives of the small Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominate the executive, including the ruling EPRDF party. Top Tigray politicians, as long as they are politically loyal to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, have veto positions in all strategically important state institutions. A well-organized clientelist system ensures that TPLF influence also reaches into the private economy and civil society organizations.
Association / assembly rights
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of association and assembly, the government did not allow opposition parties to organize freely or to canvass for new members and voters. Before the parliamentary elections, several opposition party candidates were harassed or put into prison, with the government seeking to intimidate citizens away from siding with the opposition. Oromo opposition parties with an ethnic agenda are in most cases banned or severely harassed. Dubious accusations have been leveled against opposition figures, including a “plot to overthrow the government.” Any serious challenges to EPRDF ideas by opposition leaders are equated with attempts to overthrow the government by force or with violating the constitution, and are met with harsh sentences. On the other hand, opposition parties are not effectively managed, and have shown limited ability to inspire their members or society at large to engage in a democratic society-building process.
The freedoms of assembly and association are also severely limited for interest groups and civil society. The work of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the areas of democracy, human rights and political participation has been curtailed through intimidation and a tightening of the legal space. On 6 January 2009, parliament passed a highly controversial CSO law that de facto excludes most of them from engaging in any work pertaining to human rights, conflict resolution, woman’s and children’s rights, rural development, or HIV/AIDS. The Charities and Societies Proclamation is designed to restrict the ability of foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to bypass government channels when they disburse funds. Foreign NGOs are defined as groups that receive more than 10% of their funding from abroad. All civil society organizations are required to register with the government under the new rules.
The many foreign-funded NGOs in particular have suffered under this new legislation, making it harder for the Ethiopian people to use the human and financial resources potentially offered to them by NGOs.
Freedom of expression
Although the constitution guarantees freedom of expression, several journalists have been sentenced to prison on the basis of “incorrect reporting.” The press and other media have continued to face serious restrictions, with journalists subject to arrest and prosecution for alleged defamation. In 2009, one of the most important independent news magazines, the Addis Neger, was forced to close due to harassment. Its chief editor fled the country. Other journalists practice self-censorship in order to survive as professional workers.
Internet access is available to just 1% of the population. Many sites reporting on Ethiopian sociopolitical and economic affairs are blocked. Control of the only Internet server has been a prime means of restricting the free flow of information. Government-sponsored websites propagate EPRDF ideology and justify every EPRDF action as correct and unquestionable. Media outlets controlled by the EPRDF, such as the FANA and WALTA information agencies, dominate the sector.
The lack of professionalism in the private and government media has contributed to the ease with which the government has suppressed the freedom of speech. A 2008 media law has had a further chilling effect on speech. Although it barred direct government censorship of private media, the measure allowed prosecutors to seize material before publication in the name of “national security.” It also gave the government broader powers to pursue defamation cases.
3 | Rule of Law
Separation of powers
A separation of powers is formally in place, but does not exist de facto. The EPRDF is the source of all power. The relationship between the executive and the legislative is wholly asymmetrical: While the formal legitimacy of the government stems from its parliamentary majority, the executive sets the rules and conditions under which the competition for power can take place. Several times, primarily before and after political elections, the government has signaled a readiness to use means both legal and illegal, including the recourse to violence, to crack down on political freedoms and opposition parties.
The legislature consists of the lower house, known as the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), and a smaller, supervisory senate, the House of Federation. The HPR has 547 members elected to five-year terms in single-seat constituencies. The upper house has 117 members, comprising representatives from the constituent nations, nationalities and peoples of the federation.
Although the constitution vests all powers not attributed explicitly to the federal government in Addis Ababa in the regional states, these bodies are in fact rather weak. For example, they lack the right to tax their inhabitants or to cooperate with foreign donors in order to develop the provinces (states) according to regional priorities.
In October 2009, the parliament announced a bill that significantly enlarged the powers of the executive, giving the government the power to dismiss, dissolve or reorganize all federal organs and offices in the country without scrutiny by parliament.
The judiciary and the legislative are under the full control of the ruling party. The power to interpret the constitutionality of laws rests not with the judiciary, but rather with a state organ that draws on the legal expertise of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry.
Independent judiciary
The independence of the judiciary is heavily impaired by political interference and high levels of corruption. Indeed, Ethiopia’s judiciary has never had an independent existence as a separate institution. It has been subject to all kinds of pressure from other governmental branches. Thus, external pressure on judiciary has deep roots, a history that is not without some lasting influence on the current federal judiciary.
Appointments of high-level judges are the prerogative of the political leadership, ensuring that government policies and interests are taken into account in judicial decisions. During the period under review, a number of judges and politicians fled the country due to threats, political intimidation and harassment. Suspects are routinely held without warrants, and cases can take a long time to reach court
The judiciary is to some extent institutionally differentiated, but is severely restricted by functional deficits, insufficient operational scope across the country’s territory, and scarce resources. The lack of trained professional judges is still a very serious concern for anyone seeking justice. Appointment of judges is often a task delegated systematically to local EPRDF figures. There are no official gazettes in which judicial decisions are published.
From August to November 2009, the Federal High Court passed guilty verdicts on 40 members of opposition parties accused of plotting against the government. Among them were several army officers and Berhanu Nega, a famous opposition party leader who won the elections in Addis Ababa in 2005 and subsequently had to flee abroad. The court ignored testimony by some of the accused that they had been abused and tortured in prison.
Prosecution of office abuse
Ethiopia’s Anti-Corruption Commission was founded by and remains dependent on the government. Its efficiency is not regarded as high. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are not prosecuted adequately under the law, but occasionally, in the case of allegedly disloyal civil servants, do attract adverse publicity.
Officeholder corruption is not well investigated or prosecuted at any level. Some EPRDF officeholders and their family members have become wealthy as a result of corruption and illegal practices. Harassment of private traders and businesspeople who are not affiliated with the ruling party often makes it difficult for them to compete.
The government has taken a number of steps to limit corruption, including the imposition of asset-disclosure rules for state officials. However, graft remains a significant problem. Former Prime Minister Tamrat Layne and a former defense minister were convicted of corruption in 2007, but both were released by the end of 2008, having already served several years in prison on other corruption charges.
Civil rights
A number of human rights are consistently violated by state authorities, including the rights to life and personal security, privacy, equality before the law, and equal access to justice and due process. Prohibitions of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment are not adhered to. In general, the government has shown little response to criticism by human rights organizations and Western countries, which have called for national dialogue, cooperation and respect for the constitutional rights of citizens. The independent Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has been thwarted in its fact-finding missions and its researchers have been harassed. Several of its chief officers fled the country during the period under review. According to Jon Abbink in the Africa Yearbook 2009 – 2010, the same is true of the well-respected Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association.
In July 2009, the parliament passed a new “Anti-Terrorism Proclamation,” with an extraordinarily broad definition of terrorism. Under the measure, peaceful political demonstrations, property crimes and the disruption of public services are designated as “terrorism.” The law represented a missed opportunity to build confidence and enhance public security. According to Human Rights Watch, the law could be used to prosecute peaceful political protesters and even impose the death penalty for offenses as minor as damaging public property.
Engaging in opposition politics has been generally difficult in a climate of distrust, harassment (especially in rural areas) and complete domination of the state and its resources by the ruling party. Dubious accusations have been leveled against opposition figures, including allegations of a “plot to overthrow the government,” for which 40 people were arrested in April 2010. As in previous similar cases in recent years, no credible evidence was presented, and according to many Ethiopians, spite and intimidation by the government seem to have been the dominant motive in this case.
Formally, civil rights are fully respected, and citizens can bring complaints to the ombudsman’s office. In reality, however, ethnic minorities and groups suspected of being anti-government have few if any opportunity to seek redress if their civil rights and liberties have been violated. This is particularly true in the Somali and Oromiya regions of the country, where increasing numbers of victims of violence by security forces have been denied any opportunity to claim compensation for the loss of property or lives. Opposition parties cannot expect proper protection of their legal rights by the courts. In August 2010, for example, the Federal High Court found 13 of 14 defendants guilty and one not guilty in absentia. In November, the court found another 27 guilty and sought the death penalty for the 40 defendants. The court ignored testimony by some of the accused that they had been abused and tortured in prison, and it was impossible to conclude that justice was done.
Conditions in Ethiopia’s prisons are harsh, and the International Committee of the Red Cross is not permitted to inspect federal facilities and police stations. Detainees frequently report being abused or tortured.
4 | Stability of Democratic Institutions
Performance of democratic institutions
Despite having a federal constitution with formally democratic institutions, there is tight central fiscal and political control of the regions and the lower levels of administration, the zones and districts (woredas). All institutions are under the control of the central government. Ethiopia can therefore be regarded as a typical case of a “facade democracy” in a de facto neopatrimonial one-party state: Elections take place, but fair competition between political parties and democratic participation by citizens are blocked by police and a civil administration that has attempted with increasing efficiency to monopolize state power. The national parliament has no real ability to check the executive or to represent the hopes, expectations and criticisms of the public. The ensemble of state institutions functions only in regard to one political dimension: To secure the power of the ruling class and the federal government. Members of the TPLF occupy all the highest levels all ministries. The party’s dominance is particularly evident in the armed forces and the National Intelligence and Security Office. The federal security agenda overrides local institutions. In unstable and politically sensitive areas such as Oromiya, military commanders, federal police and security organs operate largely independently of local authorities. The rule of law is arbitrarily applied, and a culture of fear is again taking root within Ethiopian society. People who do not belong to one of the EPRDF parties find it extremely difficult to secure employment in the public sector.
The National Electoral Board (NEB) is an institution of crucial importance for the democratization process. It is therefore remarkable that after two decades of multiparty elections following the collapse of the Megistu dictatorship in 1991, the NRB has been unable to come to agreement with the opposition parties concerning fair rules of the game and equal competitive opportunities for all candidates. The EPRDF-dominated NEB has prevented any genuine democratic reform, as fair and equal elections would most likely result in a triumph for opposition parties and the people of Oromiya.
Commitment to democratic institutions
Ethiopia is formally a constitutional democracy, founded on a modern constitution with a division of powers, a formally independent judiciary and guarantees of human rights. De facto, Ethiopia is an authoritarian “facade democracy,” in which the ruling party uses legal and illegal means to prevent any possible change of government, let alone a shift of regime. There is no fair competition among political parties for state power. Control of power through institutional checks and balances takes place only to a marginal degree.
Beyond their undemocratic practices, several leading personalities within the EPRDF government seem to regard liberal competitive democracy with suspicion, and are probably behind the legal moves to restrict the media and civil society. One could argue that if free and fair elections were to be held, the ruling ethnic minority (the Tigray people) would be the loser, and that ethnic groups with larger numbers such as the Amharic and Oromo peoples would almost certainly win.
5 | Political and Social Integration
Party system
There are more than 60 registered “parties” in Ethiopia, but most of them are artificial, lacking social roots in the population and are therefore unstable. EPRDF, the dominant political party, is an exception. Before 2008, the government was generally viewed as a tool of the TPLF, with little grassroots support outside Tigray. In September 2008, it was announced that the EPRDF had 4.5 million members, compared to 600,000 three years earlier. In 2010, the EPRDF claimed to have 5 million members, following immense government spending on massive membership drives, the development of party cell organizations, propaganda meetings, party and civil service training, and other unproductive government spending.
Political parties are still a young phenomenon in Ethiopia, which might help explain their volatility and instability. The ruling EFRDF party coalition is highly centralized, stable and socially rooted, while the many opposition parties in the sparsely populated regions of the country, at the peripheries in Somalia, Gambela, Kambatta and in the deep south are not well consolidated. Repression of the Oromo and ethnic Somali peoples, and government attempts to co-opt their parties into subsidiaries of the EPRDF, have helped to fuel nationalism in both Oromiya and the Ogaden.
Opposition parties are often hindered in their attempts to organize, particularly in the rural areas where party members and activists are harassed in a climate of distrust and state control.
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) won all but two of the seats in parliament in the May 2010 election (i.e., seating 545 out of the body’s 547 members), compared to 327 out of 488 total seats in the 2005 elections. This is a clear indication of declining levels of political and social integration within the multiethnic population. According to the government-dependant National Election Board, which announced the results of the 2005 elections in November of that year, after a three-month delay, an opposition led by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) won a total of 61 seats in that round of balloting, 12 more than in the previous parliament. The governing coalition also won elections for eight of nine regional parliaments. The exception was the Addis Ababa region where the urban population, including the comparatively well-educated middle classes, opposed the repressive Tigray-dominated government. Since that time, the population has obviously been intimidated by the oppressive government, and has been reluctant to take part in political party organization.
In preparation for the 2010 elections, a new opposition coalition was formed by eight parties, called Medrek, or the Forum for Democratic Dialogue. It gained support by having a broad spectrum of leaders from various backgrounds. However, efforts to build a base of support in rural areas were hindered by the EPRDF, which was afraid of competition.
Internal EPRDF party control has been maintained by evaluation sessions, which in August 2010 led to the arrest and sentencing (to between 10 and 23 years in prison) of six army officers who had allegedly conspired with and collected arms for the CUD opposition party in 2005.
One can therefore conclude that the party system is heavily polarized. An autocratic patronage-based ruling party coalition under the leadership of the TPLF, which has strong roots in the Tigray region’s society, dominates the country’s political life, while the opposition camp is highly unstable and volatile. Despite the various ethnic “liberation fronts” which challenge the state’s monopoly of power in the south, the ruling party has been able to maintain its grip on power, keep the liberation movements at bay and control the opposition parties, thus preserving the existing system of repression.
Interest groups
Ethiopia has a rudimentary system of organized interest groups, including professional associations, trade unions and manufacturers’ associations. They enjoy little autonomy, because the government has been successful in recent years in co-opting their support for the state. The trade unions in particular have always been controlled from above, aside from a Teachers Association critical of the government. However, this group was outmaneuvered through the establishment of a new association close to the government. The Manufacturers Association, the farmers union and the cooperative movements are all closely controlled by government.
The influential Orthodox Church, as well as other religious institutions, has long sought to align itself with the rulers. It would thus be naive to expect any pressure for the enhancement of democratic liberties in Ethiopia from this source.
Approval of democracy
Although Afrobarometer and other surveys on political attitudes are not allowed in Ethiopia, it can be supposed that the country’s plurality-loving people, who live within a federal political system (with more than 60 parties), appreciate political competition, free and fair elections, and democratic institutions. The majority support given to opposition parties in the 2005 Addis Ababa council elections shows clear proof of a democratic attitude among the urban electorate. Shortly afterward, the government acted with unprecedented brutality to suppress this political electorate, which had dared to make use of its civil rights. One can assume that few citizens have trust in the current constitution, because of the way it has been used by the government.
Social capital
There is a fairly low level of trust between government and people, and between the various ethnic groups. In general, representatives of the Tigray population are regarded with mistrust and skepticism by Amhararic and Oromo people, as well as by smaller tribes in the south that have often suffered from the arbitrary actions of the rulers from the “highlands.” Ethnic tension has been common during the period under review, mainly in the poorer regions of the west and south. Clashes seem to be endemic in the Ethiopian ethno-political system, because it has politicized the group identities of all ethnic and linguistic groups, pitting them against one other (for example, breeding tension between the pastoralists of Issas and Somalis, or between the agro-pastoralists of Guji and Sidama). Land scarcity and persistent drought are often the real causes of “ethnic clashes.”
The only tolerated mechanism of mediation between society and the political system are the informal Councils of Elders in rural areas. These are traditional institutions comprised of local leaders who are trusted by the local population and who in some areas enjoy a good reputation as wise peacemakers seeking justice. The elders often serve as mediators for individual cases within their ethnic group. In cases of emergency, these informal Councils of Elders are the only channels of communication and negotiation open between officers of the government and outlawed sections of society.
In the rural areas, there are also small numbers of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations, based on deeply rooted cultural traditions. However, these are unevenly distributed, and often spontaneous and temporary. Ethiopia has a long history of self-help organizations and solidarity networks at the communal level. Iddirs (originally burial societies) and equbs (saving clubs) are century-old traditional local neighborhood associations, which discriminate little on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender or party affiliation. They were brutality repressed under the Derg regime, but bounced back immediately when they were allowed again. However, these traditional self-help groups are local entities, and lack any regional or even national organization. As such, their influence on the formation of social capital is limited.
In general, Ethiopia’s society is riddled by distrust and envy, undermining development goals as well as efforts to build a common orientation among citizens that might reach beyond family and iddir. While there is some degree of self-organization in civil society, its impact is limited by cultural, socioeconomic and ethnic barriers.
II. Economic Transformation
6 | Level of Socioeconomic Development
Socioeconomic barriers
According to the UNDP, Ethiopia was still numbered among the world’s least-developed countries in 2010, despite some improvements in the agricultural sector. The country was ranked 157th out of 169 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI). Ethiopia showed some economic growth, but poverty, a rising population and socioeconomic insecurity remain serious problems. In 2010, the country’s economic growth rate was less than 2% according to the United Nations, significantly less than the 10% claimed by the government.
Overall, social inequality increased during the period under review, with a top layer of elite-related business people, officials, cadres and civil servants safe in their jobs and income, and the large mass of peasants and workers in vulnerable, dependent conditions, struggling to make ends meet and retain their dignity. Ethiopia’s per capita GDP was estimated to be about $330 in 2010, up slightly compared with 2008. Measured in dollars at purchasing power parity, GDP per head has increased slightly from $966 to $1,055 for 2009 and an estimated $1,118 for 2010. Real GDP growth is forecast by the overoptimistic government to rise to 9% in 2009, owing to positive agricultural performance, and 9.5% in 2010, helped by higher foreign investment and further improvements in the power supply.
Population growth without equivalent growth in wealth and production has contributed to the decline in socioeconomic well-being. Rural poverty and social inequality are extensive and structurally ingrained, due to ecological (poor soils), cultural (discrimination against women) and economic (low productivity) factors. Social inequality, according to the Gini Index, is not extreme; indeed, with a score of 29.8 % for 2005, Ethiopia was among the world’s most equal societies, while the average Gini score for all listed countries was 41.8%. Gender inequality was also moderate, with a score of 0.47 compared to an average of 0.53 on the Gender Empowerment Measure.
Ongoing droughts in parts of the country in 2009 and 2010 led to a warning that 5 million people would be in need of food aid, in addition to the 8 million who already received it. In October 2010, the government officially asked for emergency aid for 6.2 million people. The reason given was again “failure of the rains.” While many people died of hunger or hunger-related diseases, a famine disaster was averted by recourse to domestic and foreign food aid supplies.
It is estimated that between 50% and 60% of the country’s youth are unemployed. Health conditions are rather poor. A significant brain drain has taken place due to the poor living conditions at home, increasing repression by the government, and the attraction of comparatively higher-paying jobs abroad. It is suspected that about 30,000 migrants from Ethiopia to the industrialized world and to Middle Eastern countries, mostly females seeking work as house maids, have been victims of human trafficking, mainly to Middle Eastern countries. Some 45,000 Ethiopians have entered Yemen through Somali ports.
Economic indicators
2007
2008
2009
2010
GDP
$ mn.
19552.7
26642.5
31962.3
29717.0
Growth of GDP
%
11.5
10.8
8.8
10.1
Inflation (CPI)
%
17.2
44.4
8.5
8.1
Unemployment
%
-
-
-
-
Foreign direct investment
% of GDP
1.1
0.4
0.7
0.6
Export growth
%
10.4
-3.3
6.9
14.4
Import growth
%
31.4
12.6
16.4
15.9
Current account balance
$ mn.
-828.0
-1805.7
-2190.7
-425.4
Public debt
$ mn.
38.2
33.0
32.2
36.7
External debt
$ mn.
2620.2
2879.0
5029.5
7147.1
Total debt service
% of GNI
133.0
111.4
103.2
191.9
Cash surplus or deficit
% of GDP
-
-
-
-
Tax Revenue
% of GDP
-
-
-
-
Government consumption
% of GDP
10.4
9.7
8.2
10.2
Public expnd. on edu.
% of GDP
5.5
-
-
-
Public expnd. on health
% of GDP
4.8
4.3
4.3
-
R&D expenditure
% of GDP
0.17
-
-
-
Military expenditure
% of GDP
1.3
1.1
1.0
-
Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2009 | UNESCO Institute for Statistics | International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market Database | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.
7 | Organization of the Market and Competition
Market-based competition
A competitive market economy exists in only few sectors. Market competition operates under a weak institutional framework, although a Competition Commission was established some years ago. In the construction industry, several companies affiliated with EPRDF member parties, along with Sheikh Mohammed Al-Ahmoudi’s MIDROC investment group and the Sunshine and Friendship groups (both close to the government) are the biggest players. The transportation sector is to a large extent in the hands of businesses belonging to the para-party sector.
During the period under review, the government continued to oppose the World Bank, the IMF and European donors concerning the liberalization of the fiscal and monetary sectors, including on the issue of trade deregulation. The philosophy of the so-called Washington Consensus has not yet been accepted fully by the EPRDF government. The government needs to reform its highly protective tariff system. While there has been some progress in differentiating tariffs, the existing system is still full of contradictions and impediments to economic growth.
The informal sector is growing, particularly in urban areas. Hawking and street vending have shown a sharp increase, as have brokering services. Small-scale production facilities in carpentry, metalwork or chemical businesses are mostly registered with local authorities.
Anti-monopoly policy
Competition laws aimed at preventing monopolistic structures and conduct exist within some sectors, but are enforced inconsistently. A Competition Commission was established in 2006, and by the end of 2007 had reviewed some 23 cases. Although informally, the strongest complaints are against the government’s preferences for party-affiliated businesses, only trade-related issues were investigated. The transportation sector, for example, is to a large extent in the hands of businesspeople belonging to the para-party sector. There are a number of companies close to the government and the ruling party, which leads to a lack of transparency and corruption.
Liberalization of foreign trade
Ethiopia is not yet a member of the World Trade Organization, although the government has applied for membership. However, before Ethiopia can join the WTO, it must reform a highly protective tariff system.
Ethiopia’s central bank, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), has a strong influence on the country’s commercial community. The national currency, the birr, is closely managed by the NBE, which has maintained a policy of gradual depreciation interspersed with sharper adjustments. During the period under review, the government continued to wield the exchange rate as a policy tool to improve export competitiveness, with a 16.7% devaluation announced in September 2010. The NBE plans to introduce measures to improve liquidity management, including an overhaul of Treasury-bill auctions. Foreign-exchange reserves are expected to remain at around the current level of just over two months of import cover, as the government prefers to spend resources on development rather than build up reserves beyond this level.
The Ethiopian government has promised to adhere to an IMF-style policy framework – although it will continue to bar foreign banks – in order to retain access to donor funding.
The government has maintained a relatively tight fiscal stance because of the risk of macroeconomic imbalances after several years of rapid growth.
Despite some recent reforms, in 2009 and 2010 the World Bank noted no improvement in the areas of property registration, investor protection, credit access, or contract enforcement.
Though reluctant for ideological reasons, it is possible that the government will gradually follow the global trend toward the liberalization and deregulation of foreign trade relations.
Banking system
Ethiopia’s banking system has been open to private banks since 1997, with an increasing number operating today. The private share of the market has risen to nearly 50%. Ethiopia is one of the few countries in Africa that has not yet admitted foreign banks. In 2008, however, an office of the German Commerzbank was allowed to open, a step forward on the road to liberalization.
In a significant change to monetary policy at the end of 2010, the central bank said it would stop financing public spending, and that it would adopt a low reserve money growth target. This is aimed at tackling the problems of excess liquidity and demonetarization. The NBE recently removed limits on bank lending, noting that low inflation levels had been achieved.
II. Market Economy
8 | Currency and Price Stability
Anti-inflation / forex policy
Inflation was at 7% in 2010, resulting in large part from deflation in food prices. The September 2010 devaluation of the local currency, the birr, by 16.7% will exacerbate imported inflation. Rising inflation poses a significant challenge to liquidity management.
In a significant change to monetary policy at the end of 2010, the National Bank of Ethiopia (the central bank) said it would stop financing public spending and adopt a low reserve money growth target. This is aimed at tackling the problems of excess liquidity and demonetization.
The birr is managed closely by the central bank, which has pursued a policy of gradual depreciation with occasional sharper adjustments. The government wields the exchange rate as a policy tool, devaluing the currency to improve export competitiveness. Foreign exchange reserves have recovered since reaching dangerously low levels during the global financial crisis, and will offer some support to the birr, but reserves remain short of the recommended minimum of three months’ import cover. The currency weakened from an average of 9.6 birr to the dollar in 2008 to 14.40 birr to the dollar in 2010. This ratio is expected to rise to 19.6 birr to the dollar in 2012.
Macrostability
The government’s fiscal and debt policies do not promote macroeconomic stability. To achieve its ambitious development objectives, the country is very much dependent on foreign aid. In 2009, the government requested a 14-month IMF loan under the Exogenous Shocks Facility, to help the country cope with the adverse effects of the global recession on its balance of payments. In August 2009, a loan of $240.6 million was granted – 115% of the country’s quota. In total, Ethiopia received almost $1.8 billion in development aid and loans in 2009, bringing the total sum received since 1991 to just under $26 billion (according to J. Abbink 2010).
The country still has a huge trade imbalance (imports of $7.21 billion compared to exports of $1.56 for the year 2008), and a current account deficit of 4% of GDP. In spite of these deficits, the country remains a favorite among donor countries, due to its regional importance as a reliable partner in the struggle against state failure and terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.
Domestic revenue collection from taxes and fees has improved to some extent in absolute terms, but has declined as a percentage of GDP from 18.4% in 2006 to 14.3% in 2008 and 15.8% in 2009, climbing again to an estimated 17.7% in 2010. During this time, the central government budget was burdened by the costs of military intervention in Somalia until the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009. Government expenditure has long exceeded revenue by 2% to 3% of GDP. Expenditures totaled 22.2 % of GDP in 2006, 16.9% in 2008, 16.7% in 2009 and an estimated 19.4% in 2010.
The central government budget envisioned an outlay of $4.67 billion for 2009, but actual expenditure was $5.36 billion. The country’s external debt rose to $4.2 billion, 25% higher than in 2008, perhaps due to increased Chinese borrowing.
During the period under review, Ethiopia ran a budget deficit of 3% to 4% of GDP. The country benefited strongly from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, as nearly $4 billion of its debt was forgiven in 2005, but external debt has risen substantially since that time, increasing from $2.88 billion in 2008 to $3.60 billion in 2009, with $4.30 billion estimated for 2010 and current forecasts reaching to $5.59 billion for 2012. Net public debt was about 35.2% of GDP in 2009 and 39.8% in 2010. It is difficult to see how a country which primarily exports coffee (for a total of $376 million in 2009) can ever manage to service its debts through its own economic performance.
9 | Private Property
Property rights
An impatient government has placed the emphasis on public investment rather than private-sector growth. Property rights and regulation of the acquisition of property are defined formally by law, but there are problems with implementation according to the rule of law. Customary land rights and practices are not accorded legal respect. There has been some investment in the rural agricultural sector on the part of private agrarian entrepreneurs and party-linked businessmen who have established commercial farms, but these operations have accounted for only 5% to 10% of the agricultural production in recent years.
Land remains under public ownership, due to the strong convictions of a political leadership with sympathy for socialist ideas. Small-scale peasants, numbering about 13.3 million people, are forced to eke out a living on tiny farm plots, with the government in legal possession of all land. The power to distribute land is held by the local districts, or “woredas.” Foreign ownership of land is still disallowed in rural areas, but land leasing in urban areas has been allowed for several years.
On the other hand, the government is “generous” when it comes to foreign land acquisitions, or what critics call “land grabs.” In November 2009, the government announced that it would lease out 3 million hectares of (allegedly unused, “empty”) land to domestic and especially foreign investors over the course of three years. As a result, many subsistence farmers will likely lose their rights to use the land, and the new development activities, often run by business people from Saudi Arabia, will also threaten natural reserves and protected areas such as national parks.
Private enterprise
The government has focused on a state-led development model, which has prioritized public investment over private enterprise activity.
Foreign direct investment is encouraged by the government in specific areas, and public-private partnerships are promoted by the government as an innovative new device for development. As part of the effort to boost FDI, the government established the national Foreign Investment Advisory Council in October 2006, chaired by the trade and industry minister, while the director of the Ethiopian Investment Agency acted as his deputy. Several private companies, both foreign and local, also played a role in the council. Saudi Arabia’s Sheikh Mohammed Al-Ahmoudi is acknowledged to be Ethiopia’s largest foreign investor, with investments in agriculture, industry, mining, and construction. The export-oriented flower industry (which consumes a substantial amount of ground water, thus diminishing the water level of the great lakes south of Addis Ababa) is one of the most dynamic foreign private business sectors, and according to rumor is allowed to transfer profits freely abroad. In recent years, vast tracts of land have been leased to foreign investors in rural areas to allow for investments in flower farms, agrofuels, and tea and coffee plantations, often displacing local people.
Ethiopia has secured FDI from nontraditional sources such as China, India, Turkey, Iran and Slovakia, as well as from members of the diaspora in the United States of America and Europe. Road construction is one of the preferred sectors for foreign investors. In 2009, Chinese contractors built about 70% of all roads then under construction. China also supplied very substantial loans (over $1 billion), with about 70% going to state or party-owned companies. About 120 private Chinese companies were active in Ethiopia, alongside over 800 Chinese projects. Only a few of the Chinese investors were willing to engage in joint ventures with Ethiopian companies.
Ethiopia’s private sector remains subject to considerable constraint. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2011 report ranks 183 countries around the world on issues such as regulatory environment and the ease of doing business. Ethiopia ranks 104th, well ahead of neighbors Eritrea (180th) and Sudan (154th).
While Ethiopia’s overall ranking has stagnated, the country did in fact significantly improve the ease of starting a business during the years under review. Reforms have lowered the cost of establishing a business, from 19% of per capita income to 14%, and the minimum capital requirement from 492% of per capita income to 368%. The cost is the biggest constraint; only five procedures and nine days are required to open a business. The country is hamstrung by its landlocked nature, which increases the difficulty and cost of doing business; this fact makes it even more important to improve the policy environment.
In general, privatization processes and market-based competition have started to evolve, but slowly. The biggest obstacles to making the economy more competitive are the inadequate infrastructure, the public ownership of land, and the government’s mistrust of free, uncontrolled economic development.
10 | Welfare Regime
Social safety nets
The majority of the population is at risk of poverty. More than 10% fall into the category of absolute poverty, and are dependent on food aid from outside. Pension systems exist only for a small elite of civil servants. Employees in the formal economy can voluntarily participate in a provident fund system.
The government has embarked on a strong expansion of basic health services in rural areas. Life expectancy rose to 52.2 years in 2006 from 45.7 years in 2001. Both the Orthodox Church and – more recently – Muslim communities run local self-help welfare networks. International (such as the Bonn-based Welthungerhilfe) and local charities and NGOs (such as Menschen für Menschen) provide basic social services as well. In general, however, there is no welfare system beyond individual efforts.
Remittances from Ethiopian communities overseas (mainly from the United States, Europe and the Middle East) amounted to an officially estimated $970 million (2008), and provide a lifeline for many impoverished families. Much of this money is used as a means of subsistence, but in some cases serves as start-up capital to form small businesses for people without political connections.
Equal opportunity
Equality of opportunity is not a reality in Ethiopia. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have limited access to education, public office and employment. There are some regulations against discrimination, but their implementation is highly deficient.
Donors have contributed to the social aims of the government and the United Nations, primarily the reduction of poverty, in two ways: they have considerably reduced foreign debt, and have mobilized foreign private investment to start business in Ethiopia.
According to published reports, farm workers employed as casual workers on Saudi Arabian farms (in the context of “land grabbing”) receive salaries of $0.75 – $ 1.00 a day, hardly enough to remain at an subsistence level.
Women have traditionally had limited right to hold land or property, especially in rural areas. Today, they still have few opportunities for employment beyond agricultural labor. A Ministry for Women’s Affairs has existed since 2006, and legislation has been passed designed to protect women’s rights in a number of different areas. In practice, however, women’s rights are violated on a routine basis mainly due to limited access to education, a lack of economic opportunity, and prevailing religious practices.
11 | Economic Performance
Output strength
According to IMF estimates from April 2010, Ethiopia’s GDP grew at a rate of 9.9% in 2009; the government claimed 10% – 11% growth for the same period, and more neutral observers some 5% – 6.5%. Whatever the exact figures, one cannot deny the fact of continuous, solid economic performance during the last five years, though the effects of growth have been somewhat vitiated by strong population growth of about 3% per year. Ethiopia’s per capita GDP was estimated to be about $330, up slightly compared with 2008. According to official government figures, total GDP rose for the fiscal year 2008-2009 to an estimated $32.3 billion ($75.9 billion in purchasing power parity terms) as a result of growth in agriculture, infrastructural works and services.
While there have been remarkable increases in overall economic growth and local and foreign investment, as well as rising employment levels that augur well, foreign trade imbalances, state budget deficits and a difficult debt regime present significant problems. Nominal GDP increased from $19.1 billion (actual) in 2007 to $28.8 billion (Economist Intelligence Unit estimate) in 2008, and $29.3 billion (EIU estimate) in 2009. In 2010, nominal GDP was estimated to reach just $25.9 billion, with $24.1 billion forecast for 2011. The structural trade balance is extremely negative, due to a severe disjunction between high levels of imports of goods and services and stagnating, low levels of exports. In 2008, the country had to pay $936 million for oil imports alone (13% of all imports), more than double the revenues from Ethiopia’s greatest export crop, coffee (a value of $430 million, representing 34% of all exports). Sudan supplied about 80% of Ethiopia’s oil needs.
The trade deficit developed from -$3.08 billion in 2006, to -$3.87 billion in 2007, to -$5.65 in 2008, to -$5.28 billion in 2009 and to an estimated -$5.22 billion in 2010. From 2007 to 2010, imports of goods outpaced export growth sharply, increasing in each respective year from $5.16 billion to $7.21 billion to $6.82 billion to $6.90 billion. Goods exports stagnated in the same period, with the IMF reporting total export values of $1.23 billion (2007), $1.56 billion (2008), $1.54 billion (2009), $1.67 billion (2010). In 2010, exports received a boost from a more competitive exchange rate; this should also enhance export volumes in the near future, along with an expected rise in the volume of cash crop production (provided that coffee prices do not fall further).
The country depends heavily on current transfers, which during the period under review were twice as high as export earnings. Between 2006 and 2010 the current transfer balance developed from $1.27 billion (2006) to $3.39 billion (2007), to $4.30 billion (2008), to $3.46 billion (2009), and finally to an estimated $3.59 billion in 2010. The forecast for 2012 is $4.15 billion.
Ethiopia is one of the world’s most important coffee growing countries, producing between 220,000 and 250,000 tons of coffee annually. Coffee provides 34% of all exports (for a value of $460 million in 2008) Owing to an excess in supply, world prices for coffee have collapsed in recent years, which has made it a less reliable cash crop, and thus a less useful financial platform from which the Ethiopian economy can be diversified.
Industry, which shows a GDP share of 13%, did show some minimal growth. The Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy remained in place, despite its lack of success thus far. The government did make some progress with the privatization of state enterprises. A steady stream of privatization in recent years has resulted in the sale of companies across a wide range of sectors, from sugar and dairy farms to leather factories and textile plants. A total of 14 enterprises were privatized in fiscal year 2009 – 2010, according to the Privatization and Public Enterprises Supervising Authority. The government recently announced its willingness to sell three state-owned breweries to private companies.
All things considered, Ethiopia’s economic policy has shown reasonably good success: Macroeconomic performance has been moderately positive, with the exception of rising trade deficits and increasing levels of foreign debt, and the government has shown itself as determined to improve the country’s productive potential through the means of government-controlled market development. To be sure, it is the government that keeps the productive capacity of the country below its potentially higher levels of development, but political leaders are evidently, if gradually, moving toward acceptance of the global economy’s mainstream economic practices.
12 | Sustainability
Environmental policy
Ethiopia was ranked 141st of 163 states on the Environmental Performance Index, with a score of 43.1 (far below the average of 55.6). Environmental problems remain worrisome. Deforestation and land erosion are serious ongoing problems, and have been addressed only in selected areas through tree planting, bunding or other measures. Population growth has resulted in increasing environmental pressure, as has pollution in urban industrial areas. Plastic bags and batteries from radios, recorders and other devices are strewn across the country, a particularly noticeable problem. Agricultural land in densely populated areas of the highlands has been deteriorating steadily in recent years, leading to soil erosion and deforestation.
Environmentally compatible growth has received only sporadic consideration and has almost no institutional framework, although recently the government has embarked on a series of environmental initiatives, including a National Conservation Action Plan. Environmental awareness has grown somewhat, driven in large part by NGO reports, government information and academic research, but has not resulted in a parallel increase in policies. There has been a steady expansion of cropland at the expense of forest areas and pasture land, and a failure to devise and enforce environmental laws governing industrial waste and sewage. Uncontrolled pollution by actors such as the expanding flower industry has persisted, blighting the local environment and raising local fears over the quality of water supply and long-term land viability.
Education policy / R&D
Expenditure on education accounts for 5.5% of GDP, one of the biggest budget outlays in Ethiopia. This relatively high level of spending on education for a poor African country is a reaction to decades of neglect and low literacy rates during military rule, and reflects a government strategy to make substantial improvements in the country’s human capital. However, education and training is substandard, with relatively low quality at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and insufficient but improving school enrollment. The overall literacy rate is 35.9% (50.0% for men and just 22.8% for women). Research and development accounted for only 0.17% of GDP in 2007. Investment in education and training is regarded by the government as a high priority, with an increasing number of pupils enrolled in school, and a rising number of schools being built in rural areas. The construction of rural universities has continued (adding 13 new campuses in addition to the existing 22). However, older universities, as in Addis Ababa, have been weakened. Living conditions for students are poor, and the facilities for teaching and research remain on a very low level. In addition, the high number of bachelors and masters degree holders has led to massive unemployment among graduates. This problem is also widespread among high-school graduates. Youth unemployment, at between 50% and 60%, is extremely high.
Ethiopia remains a country with few centers of modernity and a huge backward rural sector.
Transformation Management
I. Level of Difficulty
Structural constraints
Most of the problems facing Ethiopians today are not a consequence of governmental failures or “bad governance,” but result rather from structural constraints. Ethiopia is a landlocked country that relies on its neighbors when importing oil or industrial equipment and exporting coffee and other crops. Key constraints include the fragility of the soil in the densely populated highlands, the absence of transportation and service infrastructure in the southern provinces (woredas), and poor health conditions, including high infection rates of HIV/AIDS. In addition to these natural constraints, one must point to the legacy of previous political regimes, the consequences of a long civil war, a brutal military regime under the socialist-inclined dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the 1998 – 2000 war with Eritrea, which caused the death of 100,000 people and produced immense economic destruction and popular misery. Ethiopian society is also split into ethnic communities within a federal state dominated by an ethno-cultural minority (the Tigray). The split between the Christians of the Amhara and Tigray highlands and the Muslim population in Ogaden, Oromiya and other provinces (federal states) contribute to the difficulties of nation building and state formation.
Thus, the extreme poverty of a large proportion of Ethiopia’s 8o million people stems from various causes. It is fair to say that Ethiopia ranks high worldwide in terms of the difficulties facing democratic transformation and economic development. But the remaining 25% to 33% of factors responsible for improvement in people’s living conditions must be attributed to the EPRDF government, which has now held power for 20 years.
By a very conservative estimate, several thousand people were killed in inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2010. As one of the poorest countries in the world, and with 15% of the population living on food aid delivered from outside, Ethiopia is very much dependent on foreign assistance in seeking to reduce mass poverty.
Though the HIV/AIDS epidemic remains a significant public health problem, the number of people dying from the disease dropped by about 20% to an estimated 80,000 – 90,000. This was due to increased awareness of the disease, better availability of medication and behavioral changes, notably among the urban population. Ethiopia has experienced an unprecedented demographic increase; the annual population growth rate remained around 2.7% – 3.0%, despite high maternal and disease-related mortality. The infant mortality rate, for instance, is still high at about 93 per 1000 live births.
Civil society traditions
Civil society traditions, including the NGO sector, are fairly weak. Civic organization has arisen only comparatively recently as Ethiopia has modernized, partially in response to the gap left by insufficient and ineffective state institutions in service delivery, and partially spurred by the rise in development aid ($2 billion in 2009). Most NGOs work in humanitarian and developmental fields; a smaller number is trying to provide civic education or address good governance, human rights or environmental issues. Until recently, about 8000 NGOs were working in Ethiopia, but due to the new Charities and Societies Law of January 2009, which barred civic organizations from receiving more than 10% of their budget from overseas sources, many NGOs were forced to scale down or close.
Conflict intensity
Ethnic tensions and violent incidents within Ethiopia’s heterogeneous society are common. Several mobilized ethnic groups are waging rebellions and militant protests against the government due to increasing population pressure and a shortage of agricultural land and pasture. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics. Society and the political elite are deeply divided along lines of social class, ethnicity and religious community.
The increasing population and recurrence of drought and famine has led to several major ethnic clashes in the north (between members of the Afar, Oromo and Argobba ethnic groups) and south of the country, continuing a recurrent pattern of social conflict between ethno-linguistic groups over borders, land and water resources. In the most severe recent incident, the Garri-Boran conflict in the south, around 300 people were reported killed and more than 70,000 displaced. The cause was a conflict over access to resources necessary for survival, such as fertile land and water.
Religious clashes are unusual. Some tension has been recorded between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, as well as between Orthodox Christians and Pentecostal-Evangelical Christian groups. Mainstream relations have been peaceful
II. Management Performance
14 | Steering Capability
Prioritization
The Chinese post-communist, state-capitalist model and its dominant-party governance system continues to hold appeal for Ethiopia’s leaders. The government’s overall strategic priority has been state-led stimulation of economic growth. A culture of state ownership and state control continues to dominate government thinking and the administration’s decisions. The executive has also pursued strategic priorities such as stimulating export growth, promoting the education and health sectors, and improving highways and other infrastructure. These aims have been much better realized than democratic aims, which have largely been sacrificed on the altar of political stability and the monopolization of power in the hands of the current government. The government is skilled at using the rhetoric of democracy and good governance in order to assure the continuation of support by the international donor community, but such statements rarely lead to tangible reform.
Implementation
Under its ambitious political leader Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian government is strongly reform-oriented in a general sense. There is a strong and honest commitment to modernization, as long as the autocratic, top-down style of leadership is not threatened. A new five-year economic plan, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), has been drafted and was endorsed by the legislature in December 2010. It will focus on agriculture, infrastructure and industry (including mining, manufacturing and textiles).
However, the implementation of announced reforms is often deficient, a fact linked to structural weaknesses associated with the nondemocratic regime and shortages of experience in various components of the administration. The limited autonomy possessed by parliament and judiciary and the hierarchical structure of the political system in general prevent it from attaining either legitimacy or socioeconomic efficiency.
The executive’s cooperation with the IMF demonstrates a stronger willingness to engage in reform of the financial and economic sectors than, say, the fields of health or environmental protection. The country performed well under the IMF’s 14-month exogenous shocks facility, which concluded in November 2010.
The government’s efforts to alleviate poverty showed little effect during the period under review.
Policy learning
The government has demonstrated a mixed policy learning ability with respect to international partners. The January 2009 passage of the Charities and Societies Proclamation regulating NGOs, against the strongly expressed reservations of Western governments, has been regarded by several observers as exemplary of the “doggedness of the Meles regime.” The government has in other cases too showed remarkable inflexibility and stubbornness. On November 8th, the EU Election Observer Mission for the May 2010 Ethiopian elections released its final report after a delay of almost three months. The mission blamed the delay on the fact that it was denied entry to Ethiopia in the period following the elections. The government called the final report “trash,” accused the EU mission of being biased against the electoral process in Ethiopia from the beginning, and dismissed the findings in their entirety. The relationship between the European Union and the Ethiopian government was strained from the outset, owing to lingering tensions generated by the fallout from the 2005 elections (200 demonstrators were shot and thousands were thrown into prison).
Once the EPRDF’s central leadership group has agreed on a political goal, it hardly ever changes course, regardless of political and economic costs. A good example of this attitude is the persistent refusal to alter the law barring private land ownership, though the protection of property rights is essential for long-term capital investments.
In conclusion, the government has shown limited willingness or ability to learn from past decisions regarded as errors or failures by Western diplomats. This inflexible political attitude clearly hinders the acceleration of societal development.
15 | Resource Efficiency
Efficient use of assets
The federal government makes efficient use of only some of the human, financial and organizational resources available. Federalism has allowed new ethnic elites to emerge, but has not fundamentally altered the pattern of elite-based paternalistic politics.
In summer 2009, a scandal occurred when Auditor General Assefa Desta presented a critical report on excessive government borrowing in 2006 – a sum of 3.3 billion birr in excess of the amount approved by the legislature. He called the borrowing “unlawful,” and pointed to its important subsequent economic effects, including rising inflation. As could be expected in a dictatorship, the report was unfavorably received by the finance minister and the state-appointed governor of the national bank, who disputed the audit although the auditor general had derived his work from figures supplied by them. In spite of an IMF report that confirmed the analysis of the auditor general, a new auditor general was appointed. In 2008, the budget deficit was estimated at 4.4% of GDP; however, if the $1.3 billion in donor grants were excluded, this figure would have been 8.4% of GDP.
The civil service in its entirety can be regarded as highly politicized. Administrative personnel are recruited not on the basis of professional standards and personal merit, but mainly through patrimonial networks. Membership in the ruling party is a practical necessity for appointment to any public sector job. Even higher education graduates need to be a member of one of the EPRDF parties, based on their ethnicity. As EPRDF numbers its members in the millions, attaining employment is strongly linked with membership. At the lower administrative level (woreda and keble), ownership of micro and small businesses, as well as access to financial grants and loans, requires demonstration of loyalty to the EPRDF.
Policy coordination
For the most part, the federal government fails to coordinate between conflicting objectives and between activities of administrative departments in the capital and provinces. Some policies directly conflict with each other (seeking to enhance productivity in agriculture while neglecting population planning, for example). Different components of the government tend to compete with or ignore each other. Regions vary widely in terms of resource allocation and coherence in coordination.
The comparatively less populated regions in the south and east, particularly the Afar and Somalia regions, and highly populated areas in Oromia (which share an opposition to the government and the presence of local rebellions) remained key political battlegrounds, often to the detriment of their inhabitants. Those regarded as politically disloyal or even hostile are “punished” by the government and development planners with intentional negligence.
Anti-corruption policy
The government has taken a number of steps to limit corruption, including the imposition of asset-disclosure rules for state officials. However, corruption at all levels remains a significant problem.
Anti-corruption policy has not been very successful. A political system which eliminates all major institutional checks and balances cannot be expected to cultivate a political culture of tolerance and fairness. The mentality of the TPLF and the four EPRDF coalition member parties seems to be locked in old-fashioned war-culture thinking, supported by values of neopatrimonial loyalty.
16 | Consensus-Building
Consensus on goals
While there is substantial national consensus around the creation of a strong competitive market economy, any desire to develop a multiparty democratic system based on free and fair elections has clearly been abandoned by the Meles Zenawi government. The years 2008 to 2010 featured a crackdown on political freedoms in advance of the May 2010 elections, which ultimately resulted in a landslide victory for the EPRDF. The opposition was in effect removed from parliamentary politics by its landslide election defeat, after being harassed and discriminated against by government forces in the run-up to the elections. Its divided nature and inability to raise significant funds will make it easy for the government to keep it marginalized.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who has been in power for nearly 20 years, has become a symbol of commitment to accelerated economic growth and political stability (especially in the eyes of the U.S. administration, in its struggle against “international terrorism”), but at the same time he appears to be the champion of a process of political decay or democratic regression. Political life in 2005 was much more participatory, democratic and vivid than was the case five years later.
Anti-democratic actors
The most important anti-democratic actor in Ethiopia is the government itself. It power is based on coercion.
The government has substantial control over major democratic opposition actors, who are able to use their influence to disrupt the official political agenda only to a marginal extent. Critical reformers from opposition groups and from academia are excluded from the public debate. The freedoms of assembly and association were curtailed during the period under review. In the field of higher education, the government has sought to establish a more loyal academic community by creating 13 new state universities. Growing intolerance of dissent has dampened private discussion in the country, as even ordinary citizens face harassment or arrest for speaking out against the government. All student, politician and NGO representative activities are closely monitored, and many of these figures have been arrested.
The government has successfully managed to co-opt some potential veto groups from the business community, which has seemed to be impressed by the country’s economic growth and the remarkable amount of foreign aid given to the Meles government without strict conditionality.
Cleavage / conflict management
The political leadership has not shown an intention to prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating by constructive means (e.g., by arguing and bargaining). The government has demonstrated no intention to solve social cleavages and ethnic conflicts between EPRDF supporters and opponents through dialogue and concessions. There is no open debate on crucial national issues, such as how to solve the structural problem of supporting a growing population when land and water resources are becoming increasingly scarce, a dilemma that underlies many of the so-called ethnic tensions.
In order to stay in power, the government relies more on the functional efficiency of state institutions and on oppressing the militant opposition than on persuading dissenting interest groups by peaceful means. Political repression by the police and security services and the passage of new restrictive laws has replaced previous efforts to mobilize political support.
Civil society participation
The political leadership strongly discourages civil society participation. It frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously. It sometimes pretends to seek civic society participation, but is not genuinely prepared to listen and learn. The freedoms of assembly and association are very limited, and the many CSOs or NGOs operating in the country are regarded by the government not as useful partners that might assist in solving national issues of great importance for the people, but rather as burdensome rivals.
The new Civil Society Law passed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives in January 2009 is intended to weaken the efficiency and legitimacy of CSO organizations’ work. It contains stiff penalties for organizations active in many human rights and social advocacy fields.
In order to weaken civil society organizations further, the government has launched a party member recruiting campaign. Its strategists finally understood that the party needed to widen its constituency in order to lure larger numbers of educated and urban people from the opposition. The mass recruitment drive was aided by reminders that membership was a precondition for a career in the public sector or for obtaining government services equally.
Reconciliation
The political leadership reluctantly addresses historical acts of injustice, but has not initiated a process of reconciliation with previous opponents or accused politicians. It recognizes the need to deal with historical acts of injustice during the Derg regime, and has started to take the political leaders bearing the most responsibility to court (that is, those that have not fled the country). The trials of 33 former ministers of the Mengistu regime, which was toppled in 1991, were still not complete as of the time of writing. The government is obviously more interested in fighting and punishing political opponents who pose a present-day threat to the country’s political stability.
17 | International Cooperation
Effective use of support
As one of the world’s poorest countries, Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign assistance in many ways. Over half of the state budget is financed by international donors. In 2009, the government secured foreign aid packages of more than $1.3 billion, bringing the total sum of development aid received by the country since 1991 to $24 billion. However, Ethiopia was still ranked only 169th on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (out of a total of 179 countries).
Unsurprisingly, the political leadership has made intensive use of international aid for two purposes: achieving transformation goals and to secure its own power. However, the extent to which the EPDRF ignores foreign advice is surprising. The government shows little interest in cooperating with bilateral or multilateral international donors on issues of democratization, trade liberalization or privatization. It has sought to avoid becoming too dependent on foreign countries. Negotiations with the World Bank, the IMF and the European Union’s Development Commission are usually tense.
The regime has drawn increasing levels of support from China and from India. China has become Ethiopia’s largest trade partner, supplying 20% of the country’s imports, followed by Saudi Arabia (11%) and Italy (8%). China has also supplied very substantial loans, over $1 billion, with about 70% going to state- or party-owned companies.
About 120 private Chinese companies are active in Ethiopia today, mainly in the construction sector, and are responsible for about 70% of all road construction.
In general, donor support for Ethiopia is strong, and it is likely to continue at this level in coming years. The regime is aware of its use to the U.S. government, which needs Ethiopia as an ally in its fight against Islamists in Somalia; this fact gives the Meles government substantial political leverage.
In early November 2010, the IMF approved the second and final review under Ethiopia’s exogenous shocks facility (ESF). The $240 million program was approved in August 2009, following deterioration in the country’s balance of payments position during the global recession. The final review was largely positive, with the country meeting all quantitative and structural benchmarks. The fund cited Ethiopia’s success at reducing inflation, controlling government spending and rebuilding foreign-exchange reserves.
The influence of Western countries, the World Bank and the IMF on the strategic orientation of the government is surprisingly low. The government has gained further political autonomy by establishing strong relations with the People’s Republic of China. Relations with Beijing intensified during the period under review, and were dominated by China’s economic interests and resource acquisitions. Trade with China reportedly reached a value of $1.38 billion.
This strengthening relationship has pleased an Ethiopia grateful for a political partner that refrains from criticizing the government on governance and human rights issues.
Credibility
The government tries to present itself as a credible and reliable partner, but is not trusted by all members of the international community. In regard to relations with the West, there is a clear split between the U.S. attitude toward Addis Ababa and that of EU countries.
The instability in the volatile Horn of Africa has cemented Ethiopia’s position as the United States’ key ally in the region, and the critical relationships with Eritrea and Somalia will continue to dominate the foreign policy agenda. The protracted border dispute with Eritrea remains at an impasse, and attempts at a diplomatic solution have failed. The risk of further violent conflict between the neighbors remains, although continued deadlock is the most likely scenario. The failed state of Somalia will remain a source of tension; this danger has escalated following bomb attacks carried out by a radical Islamist group called al-Shabab in Uganda in mid-2010.
Since the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2010 (particularly the latter, with the 99% victory for the ruling coalition), Ethiopia is no longer regarded as a credible or reliable partner by most EU countries. The European Union, with its well-considered concept of good governance as a precondition for sustainable peace and development, has lost influence in Ethiopia.
Regional cooperation
Ethiopia has been a member of the United Nations since 1945, and is a part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Its capital, Addis Ababa, has been the seat of the African Union (AU) since 1963, as well as of United Nations’ Economic Commission of Africa (ECA). The country is a member of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the UNDP, the U.N. Environmental Program (UNEP), UNESCO, and the World Health Organization (WHO), the IMF and the World Bank. As a member of the ACP group (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries), it is tied to the European Union through the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements.
The political leadership cooperates selectively and sporadically with individual neighboring states, but is reluctant to accept the rules set by regional and international organizations.
The conflict with Eritrea has been marked by an almost total lack of progress, and even gradual deterioration. The government still refuses to accept the 2002 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration concerning the demarcation of the border between the two countries as defined by the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) after the 1998 – 2000 interstate war.
In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew all its military forces from Somalia, under an agreement negotiated between Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government and Somali opposition groups. Troops had been stationed there for more than two years in support of the Transitional Federal Government, fighting against the militant Islamist insurgent fronts. Eritrea, which seeks to destabilize Ethiopia, supported the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which is seen as a threat to Ethiopia’s security interests. The UIC rebels have issued a declaration in favor of an ethnic Somalian state, which would include the Somali region of Ethiopia.
Though Ethiopian forces were strong enough to overcome the UIC in Somalia, a bitter and costly guerrilla war and continued regional instability will be the likely consequence. The UIC was defeated in December 2009, and the Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia.
A landlocked country, Ethiopia has maintained relatively stable and friendly relations with its other neighbors, Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti and Somaliland. Sudan supplies about 80% of Ethiopia’s oil needs. Ethiopia also remained active in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a subregional organization of northeastern African countries. Ethiopia will continue to support the fragile government of Somalia, and it will retain its position as the key U.S. ally in the volatile Horn of Africa.
In June 2009, the Nile riparian countries reached agreement on many elements of a new treaty on Nile water utilization and development, despite the persistent refusal of Egypt and Sudan to negotiate any alteration in the status quo. However, no final breakthrough was achieved with the government of Sudan and Egypt on the prominent issue of the future use of the Nile waters. Thus, the overdue decision on how Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Egypt will allocate the scarce Nile waters in the future was delayed again, thus keeping the creation of a Nile River commission on hold.
Strategic Outlook
Ethnic federalism has failed so far to resolve the challenge of national integration. The Meles Zenawi government has empowered some groups, particularly the Tigray ethnic bloc, but has not engaged in dialogue or reconciliation with others. For ethno-national minorities, including rebel groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Somali minority in the Ogaden, the concept of ethnic federalism remains artificial and repressive. On the other hand, there are political “centralists,” mainly among the Amharic political class, who would prefer the restitution of the old unitary nation-state that had held power under Emperor Haile Selassie and the military committee (the Derg, under the Mengistu dictatorship).
The idea of ethnic federalism could serve as an appropriate solution to the country’s ethnic heterogeneity if the government were to associate it with true democracy and the rule of law. However, the nine ethnic-based regional states and the two federally administered city states today lack extensive political, administrative and financial autonomy. There is no deeply rooted political stability in the country. It is advisable to encourage international donors, mainly the member states of the European Union and the European Commission itself, to press persistently for good- and sustainable-governance reforms. Overstaffed and poorly managed public bureaucracies are deadweights on the productive sectors. Ethiopia requires not less governance, but better governance, in other words “governance for development” by a responsible leadership.
If a larger number of political parties took an active role in the governance of the federal states and in the capital, state officials in the ministries would be less likely to serve their own interests, for fear of being called finally to account.
The leadership cadres should be built around a rational, merit-based system, rather than a patronage network designed to retain power for those already at the system’s top. The government should therefore be supported in its efforts to strengthen human capital in its several new universities, so that African experts in all fields of national development can be produced.
The possibility of widespread election-related civil unrest has passed, and the EPRDF hegemony will ensure political stability at least through 2012. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has agreed to stay on as party leader until 2015, and will most probably tighten his grip on power in the years to come. Indeed, during the years under review, the Meles Zenawi government has already taken additional steps toward authoritarianism, tightening the political space allowed for domestic policy action.
Many segments of the population are excluded from political participation or access to economic benefits. The EPRDF firmly monopolizes political representation, decision-making and public space. The contradiction between its de facto one-party state and its promises to deliver multiparty elections, human rights and self-determination has been a defining characteristic of policies since 1991. This has produced tensions between the government and the opposition, communal and interethnic animosities, and armed conflict between ethno-national rebels and the government, culminating in the 2005 elections crisis. The opposition boycotted local elections in 2008, accusing the EPRDF of harassment.
On the level of socioeconomic development, Ethiopia has taken already some steps toward market-based reforms, such as trade regulation and an agricultural development-led industrialization plan. These government initiatives deserve further foreign attention and financial support, though with mutually agreed-upon conditionality intact. Foreign food aid should be reduced drastically, as an increasing number or rural districts have declared themselves to be “food-aid-dependent.” This policy has damaged the national production of grains.
The increasing influence of the People’s Republic of China, which exhibits little concern for human rights while dealing with African politicians, will weaken the amount of pressure which Western countries can exert in the context of the usual “good governance” negotiations. The government in Addis Ababa knows that it today has more political options than in the past when dealing with foreign donors and international investors, but that should not be taken as an excuse to abandon all Western convictions regarding the noneconomic prerequisites for successful economic growth and social transformation. Positive incentives should be offered by EU member states in order to convince the Ethiopian government to stick in practice to the common interests and commitments of a “strategic partnership” between Africa and Europe. Therefore, international donors should whenever possible work from the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation in a spirit of critical partnership (as proclaimed in the Lisbon Declaration at the EU-Africa Summit 2007).
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